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RISK-INFORMED DECISION MAKING 
In the Context of NASA Risk Management 
 
Preface 
 
Risk management (RM) is an integral aspect of virtually every challenging human endeavor, but 
well-defined RM processes have only recently begun to be developed and implemented as an 
integral part of systems engineering at NASA, given the complex concepts that RM encapsulates 
and the many forms it can take. However, few will disagree that effective risk management is 
critical to program and project success. 
 
Recent NASA RM processes have been based on Continuous Risk Management (CRM), which 
stresses the management of risk during implementation. In December of 2008, NASA issued 
NPR 8000.4A [1], which introduced Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM) as a 
complementary process to CRM that is concerned with analysis of important and/or 
direction-setting decisions. Before, RM was considered equivalent to CRM; now, RM is defined 
as comprising both CRM and RIDM. 
 
This handbook addresses the RIDM component of RM. This is an essential part of RM since the 
decisions made during the course of a program ultimately “burn-in” the risk that must be 
retired/mitigated during the life cycle of the program (primarily during the development portion 
of the life cycle) using CRM processes to track progress towards the program’s goal. RIDM 
helps to ensure that decisions between alternatives are made with an awareness of the risks 
associated with each, thereby helping to prevent late design changes, which can be key drivers of 
risk, cost overruns, schedule delays, and cancellation. Most project cost-saving opportunities 
occur in the definition, planning, and early design phases of a project. 
 
The RIDM process described in this document attempts to respond to some of the primary issues 
that have derailed programs in the past: namely 1) the “mismatch” between stakeholder 
expectations and the “true” resources required to address the risks to achieve those expectations, 
2) the miscomprehension of the risk that a decision-maker is accepting when making 
commitments to stakeholders, and 3) the miscommunication in considering the respective risks 
associated with competing alternatives. 
 
This handbook is primarily written for systems engineers, risk managers, and risk analysts 
assigned to apply the requirements of NPR 8000.4A, but program managers of NASA programs 
and projects can get a sense of the value added by the process by reading the “RIDM Overview” 
section. It is designed to provide a concise description of RIDM and highlight key areas of the 
process. It can also be easily applied by unit engineers for application to units under their 
purview, although the application at such a low level should be based on the complexity of the 
engineering issue being addressed.  
 
The RIDM methodology introduced by this handbook is part of a systems engineering process 
which emphasizes the proper use of risk analysis in its broadest sense to make risk-informed 
decisions that impact all mission execution domains, including safety, technical, cost, and 
schedule. In future versions of this handbook, the risk management principles discussed here will 
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be updated in an evolutionary manner and expanded to address operations procedures 
procurement, strategic planning, and institutional risk management as experience is gained in the 
field. Technical appendices will be developed and added to provide tools and templates for 
implementation of the RIDM process. Examples will continue to be developed and will be 
disseminated as completed. 
 
This handbook has been informed by many other guidance efforts underway at NASA, including 
the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook (NASA/SP-2007-6105 Rev. 1), the 2008 NASA Cost 
Estimating Handbook (NASA CEH-2008), and the NASA Standard for Models and Simulation 
(NASA-STD-7009) to name a few. How these documents relate and interact with the RIDM 
Handbook is discussed in subsequent chapters. With this in mind, this handbook could be seen as 
a complement to those efforts in order to help ensure programmatic success. In fact, the RIDM 
methodology has been formulated to complement, but not duplicate, the guidance in those 
documents. Taken together the overall guidance is meant to maximize program/project success 
by providing systematic and well-thought-out processes for conducting the discipline processes 
as well as integrating them into a formal risk analysis framework and communicating those 
results to a decision-maker so that he or she can make the best-informed decision possible.  
 
Lastly, although formal decision analysis methods are now highly developed for unitary 
decision-makers, it is still a significant challenge to apply these methods in a practical way 
within a complex organizational hierarchy having its own highly developed program 
management policies and practices. This handbook is a step towards meeting that challenge for 
NASA but certainly not the final step in realizing the proper balance between formalism and 
practicality. Therefore, efforts will continue to ensure that the methods in this document are 
properly integrated and updated as necessary, to provide value to the program and project 
management processes at NASA.  
 
Homayoon Dezfuli, Ph.D. 
Project Manager, NASA Headquarters 
April 2010 
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RISK-INFORMED DECISION MAKING 
In the Context of NASA Risk Management 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Purpose 
 
The purpose of this handbook is to provide guidance for implementing the risk-informed 
decision making (RIDM) requirements of NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) document 
NPR 8000.4A, Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements [1], with a specific focus on 
programs and projects in the Formulation phase, and applying to each level of the NASA 
organizational hierarchy as requirements flow down. Appendix A provides a cross-reference 
between the RIDM-related requirements in NPR 8000.4A and the sections of this handbook for 
which guidance is provided. 
 
This handbook supports RIDM application within the NASA systems engineering process, and is 
a complement to the guidance contained in NASA/SP-2007-6105, NASA Systems Engineering 
Handbook [2]. Figure 1 shows where the specific processes from the discipline-oriented NPR 
7123.1, NASA Systems Engineering Process and Requirements [3], and NPR 8000.4 intersect 
with product-oriented NPRs, such as NPR 7120.5D, NASA Space Flight Program and Project 
Management Requirements [4]; NPR 7120.7, NASA Information Technology and Institutional 
Infrastructure Program and Project Management Requirements [5]; and NPR 7120.8, NASA 
Research and Technology Program and Project Management Requirements [6]. In much the 
same way that the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook is intended to provide guidance on the 
specific systems engineering processes established by NPR 7123.1, this handbook is intended to 
provide guidance on the specific RIDM processes established by NPR 8000.4A. 
 
1.2 Scope and Depth 
 
This handbook provides guidance for conducting risk-informed decision making in the context of 
NASA risk management (RM), with a focus on the types of direction-setting key decisions that 
are characteristic of the NASA program and project life cycles, and which produce derived 
requirements in accordance with existing systems engineering practices that flow down through 
the NASA organizational hierarchy. The guidance in this handbook is not meant to be 
prescriptive. Instead, it is meant to be general enough, and contain a sufficient diversity of 
examples, to enable the reader to adapt the methods as needed to the particular decision problems 
that he or she faces. The handbook highlights major issues to consider when making decisions in 
the presence of potentially significant uncertainty, so that the user is better able to recognize and 
avoid pitfalls that might otherwise be experienced. 
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Figure 1. Intersection of Discipline Oriented and Product Oriented NPRs and their 
Associated Guidance Documents 
 
Examples are provided throughout the handbook, and in Appendix F, to illustrate the application 
of RIDM methods to specific decisions of the type that are routinely encountered in NASA 
programs and projects. An example notional planetary mission is postulated and used throughout 
the document as a basis for illustrating the execution of the various process steps that constitute 
risk-informed decision making in a NASA risk management context (“yellow boxes”). In 
addition, key terms and concepts are defined throughout the document (“blue boxes”). 
 
Where applicable, guidance is also given on the spectrum of techniques that are appropriate to 
use, given the spectrum of circumstances under which decisions are made, ranging from 
narrow-scope decisions at the hardware component level that must be made using a minimum of 
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time and resources, to broad-scope decisions involving multiple organizations upon which 
significant resources may be brought to bear. In all cases, the goal is to apply a level of effort to 
the task of risk-informed decision making that provides assurance that decisions are robust. 
 
Additional guidance is planned to address more broadly the full scope of risk management 
requirements set forth in NPR 8000.4A, including: 
 
 Implementation of the RIDM process in the context of institutional risk management; and 
 
 Implementation of Continuous Risk Management (CRM) in conjunction with RIDM. 
 
1.3 Background 
 
NPR 8000.4A provides the requirements for risk management for the Agency, its institutions, 
and its programs and projects as required by NASA Policy Directive (NPD) 1000.5, Policy for 
NASA Acquisition [7]; NPD 7120.4C, Program/Project Management [8]; and NPD 8700.1, 
NASA Policy for Safety and Mission Success [9]. 
 
As discussed in NPR 8000.4A, risk is the potential for performance shortfalls, which may be 
realized in the future, with respect to achieving explicitly established and stated performance 
requirements. The performance shortfalls may be related to institutional support for mission 
execution1 or related to any one or more of the following mission execution domains: 
 
 Safety 
 
 Technical 
 
 Cost 
 
 Schedule 
 
Risk is operationally defined as a set of triplets:  
 
 The scenario(s) leading to degraded performance with respect to one or more 
performance measures (e.g., scenarios leading to injury, fatality, destruction of key 
assets; scenarios leading to exceedance of mass limits; scenarios leading to cost overruns; 
scenarios leading to schedule slippage).  
 
 The likelihood(s) (qualitative or quantitative) of those scenarios. 
 
 The consequence(s) (qualitative or quantitative severity of the performance degradation) 
that would result if those scenarios were to occur. 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this version of the handbook, performance shortfalls related to institutional support for mission 
execution are subsumed under the affected mission execution domains of the program or project under 
consideration. More explicit consideration of institutional risks will be provided in future versions of this handbook. 
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Uncertainties are included in the evaluation of likelihoods and consequences. 
 
Defining risk in this way supports risk management because: 
  
 It distinguishes high-probability, low-consequence outcomes from low-probability, high-
consequence outcomes;  
 
 It points the way to proactive risk management controls, for example by supporting 
identification of risk drivers and the screening of low-probability, low-consequence 
outcomes; and 
 
 It can point the way to areas where investment is warranted to reduce uncertainty. 
 
In order to foster proactive risk management, NPR 8000.4A integrates two complementary 
processes, RIDM and CRM, into a single coherent framework. The RIDM process addresses the 
risk-informed selection of decision alternatives to assure effective approaches to achieving 
objectives, and the CRM process addresses implementation of the selected alternative to assure 
that requirements are met. These two aspects work together to assure effective risk management 
as NASA programs and projects are conceived, developed, and executed. Figure 2 illustrates the 
concept. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Risk Management as the Interaction of Risk-Informed Decision Making and 
Continuous Risk Management 
 
Risk-informed decision making is distinguished from risk-based decision making in that RIDM 
is a fundamentally deliberative process that uses a diverse set of performance measures, along 
with other considerations, to inform decision making. The RIDM process acknowledges the role 
that human judgment plays in decisions, and that technical information cannot be the sole basis 
for decision making. This is not only because of inevitable gaps in the technical information, but 
also because decision making is an inherently subjective, values-based enterprise. In the face of 
complex decision making involving multiple competing objectives, the cumulative wisdom 
provided by experienced personnel is essential for integrating technical and nontechnical factors 
to produce sound decisions. 
 
Within the NASA organizational hierarchy, high-level objectives, in the form of NASA Strategic 
Goals, flow down in the form of progressively more detailed performance requirements, whose 
RM  RIDM + CRM
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satisfaction assures that the objectives are met. Each organizational unit within NASA negotiates 
with the unit(s) at the next lower level in the organizational hierarchy a set of objectives, 
deliverables, performance measures, baseline performance requirements, resources, and 
schedules that defines the tasks to be performed by the unit(s). Once established, the lower level 
organizational unit manages its own risks against these specifications, and, as appropriate, 
reports risks and elevates decisions for managing risks to the next higher level based on 
predetermined risk thresholds that have been negotiated between the two units. Figure 3 depicts 
this concept. Invoking the RIDM process in support of key decisions as requirements flow down 
through the organizational hierarchy assures that objectives remain tied to NASA Strategic Goals 
while also capturing why a particular path for satisfying those requirements was chosen. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Flowdown of Performance Requirements (Illustrative)  
 
 
1.4 When is RIDM Invoked? 
 
RIDM is invoked for key decisions such as architecture and design decisions, make-buy 
decisions, source selection in major procurements, and budget reallocation (allocation of 
reserves), which typically involve requirements-setting or rebaseling of requirements. 
 
RIDM is invoked in many different venues, based on the management processes of the 
implementing organizational unit. These include boards and panels, authority to proceed 
milestones, safety review boards, risk reviews, engineering design and operations planning 
decision forums, configuration management processes, and commit-to-flight reviews, among 
others. 
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RIDM is applicable throughout the project life cycle whenever trade studies are conducted. The 
processes for which decision analysis is typically appropriate, per Section 6.8.1 of the NASA 
Systems Engineering Handbook, are also those for which RIDM is typically appropriate. These 
decisions typically have one or more of the following characteristics: 
 
 High Stakes — High stakes are involved in the decision, such as significant costs, 
significant potential safety impacts, or the importance of meeting the objectives. 
 
 Complexity — The actual ramifications of alternatives are difficult to understand without 
detailed analysis. 
 
 Uncertainty — Uncertainty in key inputs creates substantial uncertainty in the outcome of 
the decision alternatives and points to risks that may need to be managed. 
 
 Multiple Attributes — Greater numbers of attributes cause a greater need for formal 
analysis. 
 
 Diversity of Stakeholders — Extra attention is warranted to clarify objectives and 
formulate performance measures when the set of stakeholders reflects a diversity of 
values, preferences, and perspectives. 
 
Satisfaction of all of these conditions is not a requirement for conducting RIDM. The point is, 
rather, that the need for RIDM increases as a function of the above conditions. 
 
1.5 Overview of the RIDM Process [10] 
 
As specified in NPR 8000.4A, the RIDM process itself consists of the three parts shown in 
Figure 4. This section provides an overview of the process and an introduction to the concepts 
and terminology established for its implementation. A detailed exposition of the steps associated 
with each part of the process can be found in Section 3, The RIDM Process. 
 
Throughout the RIDM process, interactions take place between the stakeholders, the risk 
analysts, the subject matter experts (SMEs), the Technical Authorities, and the decision-maker 
to ensure that objectives, values, and knowledge are properly integrated and communicated into 
the deliberations that inform the decision. 
 
Figure 5 notionally illustrates the functional roles and internal interfaces of RIDM. As shown in 
the figure, it is imperative that the analysts conducting the risk analysis of alternatives 
incorporate the objectives of the various stakeholders into their analyses. These analyses are 
performed by, or with the support of, subject matter experts in the domains spanned by the 
objectives. The completed risk analyses are deliberated, along with other considerations, and the 
decision-maker selects a decision alternative for implementation (with the concurrence of the 
relevant Technical Authorities). The risk associated with the selected decision alternative 
becomes the central focus of CRM activities, which work to mitigate it during implementation, 
thus avoiding performance shortfalls in the outcome. 
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Figure 4. The RIDM Process  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Functional Roles and Information Flow in RIDM (Notional)  
 
The RIDM process is portrayed in this handbook primarily as a linear sequence of steps, each of 
which is conducted by individuals in their roles as stakeholders, risk analysts, subject matter 
experts, and decision-makers. The linear step-wise approach is used for instructional purposes 
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only. In reality, some portions of the processes may be conducted in parallel, and steps may be 
iterated upon multiple times before moving to subsequent steps. 
 
In particular, Part 2, Risk Analysis of Alternatives, is internally iterative as analyses are refined 
to meet decision needs in accordance with a graded approach, and Part 2 is iterative with Part 3, 
Risk-Informed Alternative Selection, as stakeholders and decision-makers iterate with the risk 
analysts in order to develop a sufficient technical basis for robust decision making. Additionally, 
decisions may be made via a series of downselects, each of which is made by a different 
decision-maker who has been given authority to act as proxy for the responsible decision 
authority. 
 
 
RIDM Functional Roles* 
 
Stakeholders - A stakeholder is an individual or organization that is materially affected by the 
outcome of a decision or deliverable but is outside the organization doing the work or making the 
decision [NPD 1000.0A]; e.g., Center Directors (CDs), Mission Support Offices (MSOs). 
 
Risk Analysts – A risk analyst is an individual or organization that applies probabilistic methods 
to the quantification of performance with respect to the mission execution domains of safety, 
technical, cost, and schedule. 
 
Subject Matter Experts – A subject matter expert is an individual or organization with expertise 
in one or more topics within the mission execution domains of safety, technical, cost, or schedule. 
 
Technical Authorities – The individuals within the Technical Authority process who are funded 
independently of a program or project and who have formally delegated Technical Authority 
traceable to the Administrator. The three organizations who have Technical Authorities are 
Engineering, Safety and Mission Assurance, and Health and Medical. [NPD 1000.0A] 
 
Decision-Maker – A decision-maker is an individual with responsibility for decision making within 
a particular organizational scope. 
 
*Not to be interpreted as official job positions but as functional roles. 
 
 
Part 1, Identification of Alternatives 
 
In Part 1, Identification of Alternatives, objectives, which in general may be multifaceted and 
qualitative, are decomposed into their constituent-derived objectives, each of which reflects an 
individual issue that is significant to some or all of the stakeholders. At the lowest level of 
decomposition are performance objectives, each of which is associated with a performance 
measure that quantifies the degree to which the performance objective is addressed by a given 
decision alternative. In general, a performance measure has a “direction of goodness” that 
indicates the direction of increasingly beneficial performance measure values. A comprehensive 
set of performance measures is considered collectively for decision making, reflecting 
stakeholder interests and spanning the mission execution domains of: 
 
 Safety (e.g., avoidance of injury, fatality, or destruction of key assets) 
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 Technical (e.g., thrust or output, amount of observational data acquired) 
 
 Cost (e.g., execution within allocated cost) 
 
 Schedule (e.g., meeting milestones) 
 
Objectives whose performance measure values must remain within defined limits for every 
feasible decision alternative give rise to imposed constraints that reflect those limits. Objectives 
and imposed constraints form the basis around which decision alternatives are compiled, and 
performance measures are the means by which their ability to meet imposed constraints and 
satisfy objectives is quantified. 
 
Part 2, Risk Analysis of Alternatives 
 
In Part 2, Risk Analysis of Alternatives, the performance measures of each alternative are 
quantified, taking into account any significant uncertainties that stand between the selection of an 
the alternative and the accomplishment of the objectives. Given the presence of uncertainty, the 
actual outcome of a particular decision alternative will be only one of a spectrum of forecasted 
outcomes, depending on the occurrence, nonoccurrence, or quality of occurrence of intervening 
events. Therefore, it is incumbent on risk analysts to model each significant possible outcome, 
accounting for its probability of occurrence, in terms of the scenarios that produce it. This 
produces a distribution of outcomes for each alternative, as characterized by probability density 
functions (pdfs) over the performance measures (see Figure 6).  
 
RIDM is conducted using a graded approach, i.e., the depth of analysis needs to be 
commensurate with the stakes and complexity of the decision situations being addressed. Risk 
analysts conduct RIDM at a level sufficient to support robust selection of a preferred decision 
alternative. If the uncertainty on one or more performance measures is preventing the 
decision-maker from confidently assessing important differences between alternatives, then the 
risk analysis may be iterated in an effort to reduce uncertainty. The analysis stops when the 
technical case is made; if the level of uncertainty does not preclude a robust decision from being 
made then no further uncertainty reduction is warranted. 
 
 
Robustness 
 
A robust decision is one that is based on sufficient technical evidence and characterization of 
uncertainties to determine that the selected alternative best reflects decision-maker preferences 
and values given the state of knowledge at the time of the decision, and is considered insensitive 
to credible modeling perturbations and realistically foreseeable new information. 
 
 
The principal product of the risk analysis is the Technical Basis for Deliberation (TBfD), a 
document that catalogues the set of candidate alternatives, summarizes the analysis 
methodologies used to quantify the performance measures, and presents the results. The TBfD is 
the input that risk-informs the deliberations that support decision making. The presence of this 
information does not necessarily mean that a decision is risk-informed; rather, without such 
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information, a decision is not risk-informed. Appendix D contains a template that provides 
guidance on TBfD content. It is expected that the TBfD will evolve as the risk analysis iterates. 
 
 
Performance Objectives, Performance Measures, and Imposed Constraints 
 
In RIDM, top-level objectives, which may be multifaceted and qualitative, are decomposed into a 
set of performance objectives, each of which is implied by the top-level objectives, and which 
cumulatively encompass all the facets of the top-level objectives. Unlike top-level objectives, each 
performance objective relates to a single facet of the top-level objectives, and is quantifiable. 
These two properties of performance objectives enable quantitative comparison of decision 
alternatives in terms of capabilities that are meaningful to the RIDM participants. Examples of 
possible performance objectives are: 
 
● Maintain Astronaut Health and Safety  ● Minimize Cost 
 
● Maximize Payload Capability   ● Maximize Public Support 
 
A performance measure is a metric used to quantify the extent to which a performance objective 
is fulfilled. In RIDM, a performance measure is associated with each performance objective, and it 
is through performance measure quantification that the capabilities of the proposed decision 
alternatives are assessed. Examples of possible performance measures, corresponding to the 
above performance objectives, are: 
 
● Probability of Loss of Crew (P(LOC))  ● Cost ($) 
 
● Payload Capability (kg)    ● Public Support (1 – 5) 
 
Note that, in each case, the performance measure is the means by which the associated 
performance objective is assessed. For example, the ability of a proposed decision alternative to 
Maintain Astronaut Health and Safety (performance objective) may be measured in terms of its 
ability to minimize the Probability of Loss of Crew, P(LOC) (performance measure). 
 
Although performance objectives relate to single facets of the top-level objectives, this does not 
necessarily mean that the corresponding performance measure is directly measurable. For 
example, P(LOC) might be used to quantify Maintain Astronaut Health and Safety, but the 
quantification itself might entail an assessment of vehicle reliability and abort effectiveness in the 
context of the defined mission profile. 
 
An imposed constraint is a limit on the allowable values of the performance measure with which it 
is associated. Imposed constraints reflect performance requirements that are negotiated between 
NASA organizational units and which define the task to be performed. In order for a proposed 
decision alternative to be feasible it must comply with the imposed constraints. A hard limit on the 
minimum payload capability that is acceptable is an example of a possible imposed constraint. 
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Figure 6. Uncertainty of Forecasted Outcomes Due to Uncertainty of Analyzed Conditions  
 
 
Part 3, Risk-Informed Alternative Selection 
 
In Part 3, Risk-Informed Alternative Selection, deliberation takes place among the stakeholders 
and the decision-maker, and the decision-maker either culls the set of alternatives and asks for 
further scrutiny of the remaining alternatives OR selects an alternative for implementation OR 
asks for new alternatives.  
 
To facilitate deliberation, a set of performance commitments is associated with each alternative. 
Performance commitments identify the performance that an alternative is capable of, at a given 
probability of exceedance, or risk tolerance. By establishing a risk tolerance for each 
performance measure independent of the alternative, comparisons of performance among the 
alternatives can be made on a risk-normalized basis. In this way, stakeholders and 
decision-makers can deliberate the performance differences between alternatives at common 
levels of risk, instead of having to choose between complex combinations of performance and 
risk. 
 
Deliberation and decision making might take place in a number of venues over a period of time 
or tiered in a sequence of downselects. The rationale for the selected decision alternative is 
documented in a Risk-Informed Selection Report (RISR), in light of: 
 
 The risk deemed acceptable for each performance measure; 
 
 The risk information contained in the TBfD; and 
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 The pros and cons of each contending decision alternative, as discussed during the 
deliberations. 
 
Guidance for the RISR is provided in Appendix E. This assures that deliberations involve 
discussion of appropriate risk-related issues, and that they are adequately addressed and 
integrated into the decision rationale.  
 
 
Performance Commitments 
 
A performance commitment is the performance measure value, at a given risk tolerance level 
for that performance measure, acceptable to the decision-maker for the alternative that was 
selected. Performance commitments are used within the RIDM process in order to: 
 
 ● Allow comparisons of decision alternatives in terms of performance capability at the 
specified risk tolerances of each performance measure (i.e., risk normalized). 
 
 ● Serve as the starting point for requirements development, so that a linkage exists 
between the selected alternative, the risk tolerance of the decision-maker, and the 
requirements that define the objective to be accomplished. Performance commitments 
are not themselves performance requirements. Rather, performance commitments 
represent achievable levels of performance that are used to risk-inform the development 
of credible performance requirements as part of the overall systems engineering process. 
 
The figure below shows a Performance Commitment C for Performance Measure X. Performance 
Measure X is characterized by a probability density function (pdf), due to uncertainties that affect 
the analyst’s ability to forecast a precise value. The decision maker’s risk tolerance level for not 
meeting Performance Commitment C is represented by the shaded area labeled “Risk”. 
 
When comparing alternatives, the decision maker looks for an alternative whose performance 
commitments meet the imposed constraints and which compares favorably to the other 
alternatives. Performance commitments are discussed in detail in Section 3.3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance
Commitment
Performance Measure X
Risk
Direction of Goodness
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1.6 Avoiding Decision Traps 
 
Examination of actual decision processes shows a tendency for decision-makers to fall into 
certain decision traps. These traps have been categorized as follows [11]:  
 
 Anchoring — This trap is the tendency of decision-makers to give disproportionate 
weight to the first information they receive, or even the first hint that they receive. It is 
related to a tendency for people to reason in terms of perturbations from a “baseline” 
perception, and to formulate their baseline quickly and sometimes baselessly.  
 
 Status Quo Bias — There is a tendency to want to preserve the status quo in weighing 
decision alternatives. In many decision situations, there are good reasons (e.g., financial) 
to preserve the status quo, but the bias cited here is a more basic tendency of the way in 
which people think. Reference [11] notes that early designs of “horseless carriages” were 
strongly based on horse-drawn buggies, despite being sub-optimal for engine-powered 
vehicles. There is also the tendency for managers to believe that if things go wrong with a 
decision, they are more likely to be punished for having taken positive action than for 
having allowed the status quo to continue to operate.  
 
 Sunk-Cost — This refers to the tendency to throw good money after bad: to try to recoup 
losses by continuing a course of action, even when the rational decision would be to walk 
away, based on the current state of knowledge. This bias is seen to operate in the 
perpetuation of projects that are floundering by any objective standard, to the point where 
additional investment diverts resources that would be better spent elsewhere. A decision 
process should, in general, be based on the current situation: what gain is expected from 
the expenditure being contemplated. 
 
 Confirmation Bias — This refers to the tendency to give greater weight to evidence that 
confirms our prior views, and even to seek out such evidence preferentially. 
 
 Framing — This refers to a class of biases that relate to the human tendency to respond 
to how a question is framed, regardless of the objective content of the question. People 
tend to be risk-averse when offered the possibility of a sure gain, and risk-seeking when 
presented with a sure loss. However, it is sometimes possible to describe a given situation 
either way, which can lead to very different assessments and subsequent decisions. 
 
 Overconfidence — This refers to the widespread tendency to underestimate the 
uncertainty that is inherent in the current state of knowledge. While most “experts” will 
acknowledge the presence of uncertainty in their assessments, they tend to do a poor job 
of estimating confidence intervals, in that the truth lies outside their assessed bounds 
much more often than would be implied by their stated confidence in those bounds. This 
is particularly true for decisions that are challenging to implement, as many decisions at 
NASA are. In the face of multiple sources of uncertainty, people tend to pay attention to 
the few with which they have the most experience, and neglect others. It is also 
particularly true for highly unlikely events, where there is limited data available to inform 
expert judgment. 
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 Recallability — This refers to the tendency of people to be strongly influenced by 
experiences or events that are easier for them to recall, even if a neutral statistical 
analysis of experience would yield a different answer. This means that dramatic or 
extreme events may play an unwarrantedly large role in decision making based on 
experience. 
 
The RIDM process helps to avoid such traps by establishing a rational basis for decision-making, 
ensuring that the implications of each decision alternative have been adequately analyzed, and by 
providing a structured environment for deliberation in which each deliberator can express the 
merits and drawbacks of each alternative in light of the risk analysis results.  
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2. RIDM PROCESS INTERFACES 
 
As discussed in Section 1, within each NASA organizational unit, RIDM and CRM are 
integrated into a coherent RM framework in order to: 
 
 Foster proactive risk management; 
 
 Better inform decision making through better use of risk information; and 
 
 More effectively manage implementation risks by focusing the CRM process on the 
baseline performance requirements emerging from the RIDM process. 
 
The result is a RIDM process within each unit that interfaces with the unit(s) at the next higher 
and lower levels in the organizational hierarchy when negotiating objectives and establishing 
baseline performance requirements, as well as with its own unit’s CRM process during 
implementation. This situation is illustrated graphically in Figure 7, which has been reproduced 
from NPR 8000.4A.2 The following subsections discuss these interfaces in more detail. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Coordination of RIDM and CRM Within the NASA Hierarchy (Illustrative)  
 
                                                 
2 Figure 5 in NPR 8000.4A. 
Performance Requirements Development
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2.1 Negotiating Objectives Across Organizational Unit Boundaries 
 
Organizational units negotiate with the unit(s) at the next lower level, including center support 
units, a set of objectives, deliverables, performance requirements, performance measures, 
resources, and schedules that defines the tasks to be performed. These elements reflect the 
outcome of the RIDM process that has been conducted by the level above and the execution of 
its own responsibility to meet the objectives to which it is working. 
 
 The organizational unit at the level above is responsible for assuring that the objectives 
and imposed constraints assigned to the organizational unit at the lower level reflect 
appropriate tradeoffs between and among competing objectives and risks. Operationally, 
this means that a linkage is maintained to the performance objectives used in the RIDM 
process of the unit at the higher level. It also means that the rationale for the selected 
alternative is preserved, in terms of the imposed constraints that are accepted by the unit 
at the lower level. 
 
 The organizational unit at the level below is responsible for establishing the feasibility 
and capability of accomplishing the objectives within the imposed constraints, and 
managing the risks of the job it is accepting (including identification of mission support 
requirements). 
 
Additional discussion related to objectives can be found in Section 3.1.1.  
 
2.2 Coordination of RIDM and CRM 
 
RIDM and CRM are complementary RM processes that operate within every organizational unit. 
Each unit applies the RIDM process to decide how to meet objectives and applies the CRM 
process to manage risks associated with implementation.3 In this way, RIDM and CRM work 
together to provide comprehensive risk management throughout the entire life cycle of the 
project.  The following subsections provide an overview of the coordination of RIDM and CRM. 
Additional information can be found in Section 4. 
 
2.2.1 Initializing the CRM Risks Using the Risk Analysis of the Selected Alternative 
 
For the selected alternative, the risk analysis that was conducted during RIDM represents an 
initial identification and assessment of the scenarios that could lead to performance shortfalls. 
These scenarios form the basis for an initial risk list that is compiled during RIDM for 
consideration by the decision-maker. Upon implementation of the selected alternative, this 
information is available to the CRM process to initialize its Identify, Analyze, and Plan activities. 
Figure 8 illustrates the situation. The scenarios identified by the risk analysis are input to the 
Identify activity. The effects that these scenarios have on the ability to meet the baselined 
performance requirements are assessed in the Analyze activity. This activity integrates the 
                                                 
3 In the context of CRM, the term “risk” is used to refer to a family of scenarios potentiated by a particular 
identifiable underlying condition that warrants risk management attention, because it can lead to performance 
shortfalls. This usage is more specific than the operational definition of risk presented in Section 1.3, and is 
formulated so that the underlying conditions can be addressed during implementation. 
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scenario-based risk analysis from RIDM into the CRM analysis activities as a whole, in the 
context of the baselined performance requirements to which CRM is managing. Strategies for 
addressing risks and removing threats to requirements are developed in the Plan activity, and are 
also informed by the RIDM risk analysis. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. RIDM Input to CRM Initialization 
 
While the risk analysis of the selected alternative informs CRM, it does not replace the need for 
independent CRM Identify, Analyze, and Plan activities. There are many reasons for this, but one 
key reason is that the risk analysis in RIDM is conducted expressly for the purposes of 
distinguishing between alternatives and generating performance commitments, not for the 
purpose of managing risk during implementation. Therefore, for example, uncertainties that are 
common to all alternatives and that do not significantly challenge imposed constraints will 
typically not be modeled to a high level of detail since they do not serve to discriminate between 
alternatives or affect the feasibility of the alternative. They will instead be modeled in a more 
simple and conservative manner. Also, the performance requirements of the selected alternative 
are baselined outside the RIDM process, and may differ from the performance commitments 
used in the risk analysis to define risk and develop mitigation strategies. 
 
Once the CRM process produces a baseline risk list and develops mitigation strategies, these 
CRM products can be used to update the RIDM risk analysis for the selected alternative, as well 
as other alternatives to which the updated risk information and/or mitigation strategies are 
applicable. A change in the risk analysis results may represent an opportunity to reconsider the 
decision in light of the new information, and could justify modifying the selected alternative. 
Such opportunities can arise from any number of sources throughout the program/project life 
cycle. This feedback is illustrated in Figure 7. 
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2.2.2 Rebaselining of Performance Requirements 
 
Following the selection of an alternative and the subsequent baselining of performance 
requirements, CRM operates to implement the selection in compliance with the performance 
requirements. Ideally, CRM will operate smoothly to achieve the objectives without incident. 
However, circumstances may arise which make managing the risk of the selected alternative 
untenable, and rebaselining of requirements becomes necessary. This might be due to: 
 
 A newly identified risk-significant scenario for which no mitigation is available within 
the scope of the current requirements; or 
 
 An emerging inability to control a previously identified risk. 
 
When this occurs, the decision for managing the issue is elevated as appropriate within the CRM 
process. Two distinct cases are possible: 
 
 The unit at the organizational level to which the decision has been elevated might choose 
to relax the performance requirement(s) that have been negotiated with levels below, 
enabling implementation to proceed with the current alternative, or 
 
 The unit at the organizational level to which the decision has been elevated might choose 
not to modify the performance requirement(s) that have been negotiated with the unit that 
has elevated the decision. In this case, RIDM is re-executed at the level that must adhere 
to its performance requirements, potentially producing a new or modified alternative with 
corresponding new sets of derived performance requirements. 
 
Rebaselining is done in light of current conditions. These conditions include not only the 
circumstances driving the rebaselining, but also those of the activity in general, such as budget 
status and accomplishments to date. The situation is shown in Figure 9, where decisions to 
address risks within CRM have been elevated to the appropriate level and RIDM is re-invoked to 
produce an updated alternative to serve as the basis for rebaselined requirements. 
 
As indicated by the figure, the RIDM process is re-entered at Part 1, Identification of 
Alternatives, which addresses the development of performance measures and imposed 
constraints, as well as the compilation of a set of alternatives for analysis. In general, it is not 
expected that the performance measures will change, so RIDM is re-executed using those 
derived from the existing objectives hierarchy. However, there may be cause to modify an 
imposed constraint, particularly if it relates to the threatened requirement(s) and if 
modification/relaxation produces feasible requirements at a tolerable impact to objectives. 
 
The set of decision alternatives compiled for risk analysis may also differ from the set analyzed 
initially. Alternatives that were previously shown to be unattractive can be excluded if they are 
unaffected by the circumstances surrounding the rebaselining. But the circumstances might also 
suggest alternatives that weren’t considered before; care should be taken to identify these 
alternatives, and not draw only from the previous set. 
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Figure 9. Rebaselining of Performance Requirements  
 
Once the new set of decision alternatives is identified, RIDM proceeds as usual, taking 
advantage of the previous risk analysis to the extent practical given the new set and the current 
program/project status. Generation of a revised risk analysis to risk-inform subsequent 
deliberations will help the stakeholders and decision-maker to guard against sunk cost or status 
quo decision traps (discussed in Section 1.6) when deliberating and selecting a new or modified 
decision alternative. 
 
The effects of requirements rebaselining are not confined to the organization that is the keeper of 
the original CRM risk. Every organization in the NASA hierarchy whose requirements are 
derived from the rebaselined requirements is potentially affected. The scope of affected 
organizations depends on the level at which the risk originates, the number of levels that the risk 
management decision is elevated by before it can be mitigated within the baseline requirements 
of the unit to which it is elevated, and the particulars of any changes to the mitigating unit’s 
flowed-down requirements. Figure 10 illustrates the process, as well as the potential scope of the 
rebaselined requirements flowdown. 
 
In certain instances, new information may emerge that represents an opportunity to rethink a 
previous decision. Just such a situation was mentioned in the case where the CRM process 
produces a mitigation strategy that, if retroactively applied to the set of candidate decision 
alternatives, could shift the preferred alternative from the selected alternative to a different one. 
Other opportunities can arise from ancillary analyses conducted either internally or externally to 
NASA, technology advancements, test results, etc. 
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Figure 10. Scope of Potentially Affected Organizations Given Rebaselining  
 
 
2.3 Maintaining the RIDM Process 
 
The discussion of RIDM interfaces in the previous sections shows the importance of maintaining 
a functioning RIDM capability throughout the program/project life cycle. This capability 
includes: 
 
 Reviewable TBfD and RISR documents containing the rationale for prior decision 
making and the discussion of issues of significance to the stakeholders. 
 
 Accessible objectives hierarchies (discussed in Section 3.1.1) to serve as the sources of 
relevant performance measures or as the anchor points for decomposing objectives to 
finer levels of resolution. This assures that decisions remain tied to NASA strategic goals. 
 
 Accessible risk analysis framework structures and risk models that were used to quantify 
the performance measures. 
 
 The ability, at every organizational level, to integrate information from lower levels to 
support RIDM processes that reflect current conditions throughout the NASA hierarchy. 
This includes program/project status details as well as relevant analyses. 
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 Access to relevant discipline-specific analyses to use as input to risk analysis, as well as 
access to relevant expertise to support additional discipline-specific analyses needed for 
decision making. 
 
 Maintenance of risk analysis expertise to coordinate the development of risk information 
and integrate it into the TBfD. 
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3. THE RIDM PROCESS 
 
Figure 11 expands the three parts of RIDM into a sequence of six process steps. 
 
  
 
Figure 11. RIDM Process Steps  
 
It is important to note that although Figures 4 and 11 depict the RIDM process as a linear 
sequence of steps, in practice it is expected that some steps could overlap in time and that the 
process is iterative. Information from latter steps feeds back into progressively more refined 
execution of previous steps until stakeholder issues are adequately addressed and the 
decision-maker has sufficient information, at a sufficient level of analytical rigor, to make a 
robust risk-informed decision. The primary issues driving the need for iteration are discussed in 
the following subsections, in the context of the RIDM process steps in which they arise. 
 
The RIDM process has been informed by current theoretical and practical work in decision 
analysis and analytic-deliberative processes (see, for example, [12], [13], [14]). Some 
methodological tools and techniques, such as objectives hierarchies, performance measures, and 
deliberation, have been adopted into the RIDM process as being generally applicable to 
structured, rational decision making. Others, such as analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and multi-
attribute utility theory (MAUT), are formally applicable to rational decision making but also 
present practical challenges in the context of requirements development within a complex 
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organizational hierarchy having its own highly developed program management policies and 
practices. It is left to the discretion of the practitioner to determine, on a case-by-case basis, 
whether or not such techniques will aid in deliberation and selection of a decision alternative. 
 
 
Planetary Science Mission Example 
 
An example application of the RIDM process steps is presented in this handbook for a hypothetical 
planetary science mission. This example is contained in yellow boxes distributed throughout Section 3. 
Discussion of each RIDM process step is followed by a notional example of how it might be applied to 
a specific decision, derived from specific objectives. 
 
The methods, measures, scope, and level of detail used in the planetary science mission example are 
not meant to prescribe how the RIDM process is to be applied in every instance. Rather, they are 
meant to give the reader a more concrete understanding of the RIDM process and its practical 
application, in addition to the more academic treatment in the main text. 
 
 
The sections that follow provide a process overview, discussing each of the main activities that 
support each step. 
 
3.1 Part 1 – Identification of Alternatives 
 
As indicated in NPR 8000.4A and illustrated in Figure 4 of this handbook, decision alternatives 
are identifiable only in the context of the objectives they are meant to satisfy. Therefore, 
identification of alternatives begins with the process of understanding stakeholder expectations. 
From there, a basis for evaluating decision alternatives is developed by decomposing stakeholder 
expectations into quantifiable objectives that enable comparison among the candidates. Only 
then, after an appropriate context has been established, is it possible to compile a set of feasible 
alternatives that address the objectives. Figure 12 illustrates this part of the process, which is 
delineated in subsequent subsections. 
 
3.1.1 Step 1 – Understand Stakeholder Expectations and Derive Performance Measures 
 
3.1.1.1 Understand Stakeholder Expectations 
 
The development of unambiguous performance measures and imposed constraints, reflecting 
stakeholder expectations, is the foundation of sound decision making. Paragraph 3.2.1 of NPR 
7123.1A establishes systems engineering process requirements for stakeholder expectations 
definition, and Section 4.1 of the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook provides further 
guidance on understanding stakeholder expectations. 
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Figure 12. RIDM Process Flowchart: Part 1, Identification of Alternatives  
 
Typical inputs needed for the stakeholder expectations definition process include: 
 
 Upper Level Requirements and Expectations: These would be the requirements and 
expectations (e.g., needs, wants, desires, capabilities, constraints, external interfaces) that 
are being flowed down to a particular system of interest from a higher level (e.g., 
program, project, etc.). 
 
 Stakeholders: Individuals or organizations that are materially affected by the outcome of 
a decision or deliverable but are outside the organization doing the work or making the 
decision. 
 
A variety of organizations, both internal and external to NASA, may have a stake in a particular 
decision. Internal stakeholders might include NASA Headquarters (HQ), the NASA Centers, and 
NASA advisory committees. External stakeholders might include the White House, Congress, 
the National Academy of Sciences, the National Space Council, and many other groups in the 
science and space communities. 
 
Stakeholder expectations, the vision of a particular stakeholder individual or group, result when 
they specify what is desired as an end state or as an item to be produced and put bounds upon the 
achievement of the goals. These bounds may encompass expenditures (resources), time to 
deliver, performance objectives, or other less obvious quantities such as organizational needs or 
geopolitical goals. 
Do the
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and imposed constraints
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• Get stakeholder input
• Construct trade tree of candidate
alternatives
• Perform preliminary evaluation
• Prune infeasible alternatives
Output of Part 1
• Feasible alternatives
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Expectations and Derive
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Step 2 - Compile Feasible
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Typical outputs for capturing stakeholder expectations include the following: 
 
 Top-Level Requirements and Expectations: These would be the top-level needs, 
wants, desires, capabilities, constraints, and external interfaces for the product(s) to be 
developed. 
 
 Top-Level Conceptual Boundaries and Functional Milestones: This describes how the 
system will be operated during the life cycle phases to meet stakeholder expectations. It 
describes the system characteristics from an operational perspective and helps facilitate 
an understanding of the system goals. This is usually accomplished through use-case 
scenarios, design reference missions (DRMs), and concepts of operation (ConOps). 
 
In the terminology of RIDM, the stakeholder expectations that are the outputs of this step consist 
of top-level objectives and imposed constraints. Top-level objectives state what the stakeholders 
hope to achieve from the activity. They are typically qualitative and multifaceted, reflecting 
competing sub-objectives (e.g., more data vs. lower cost). Imposed constraints represent the top-
level success criteria for the undertaking, outside of which the top-level objectives are not 
achieved. For example, if an objective is to put a satellite of a certain mass into a certain orbit, 
then the ability to loft that mass into that orbit is an imposed constraint, and any proposed 
solution that is incapable of doing so is infeasible. 
 
3.1.1.2 Derive Performance Measures 
 
In general, decision alternatives cannot be directly assessed relative to multifaceted and/or 
qualitative top-level objectives. Although the top-level objectives state the goal to be 
accomplished, they may be too complex, as well as vague, for any operational purpose. To deal 
with this situation, objectives are decomposed, using an objectives hierarchy, into a set of 
conceptually distinct lower-level objectives that describe the full spectrum of necessary and/or 
desirable characteristics that any feasible and attractive alternative should have. When these 
objectives are quantifiable via performance measures, they provide a basis for comparing 
proposed alternatives. 
 
Constructing an Objectives Hierarchy 
 
An objectives hierarchy is constructed by subdividing an objective into lower-level objectives of 
more detail, thus clarifying the intended meaning of the general objective. Decomposing an 
objective into precise lower-level objectives clarifies the tasks that must be collectively achieved 
and provides a well-defined basis for distinguishing between alternative means of achieving 
them. 
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Planetary Science Mission Example:  Understand Stakeholder Expectations 
 
 The Planet “X” Program Office established an objective of placing a scientific platform in orbit around 
 Planet “X” in order to gather data and transmit it back to Earth. Stakeholders include: 
 
 ● The planetary science community who will use the data to further humanity’s understanding of 
the formation of the solar system 
 
 ● The Earth science community who will use the data to refine models of terrestrial climate 
change and geological evolution 
 
 ● Environmental groups who are concerned about possible radiological contamination of Planet 
“X” in the event of an orbital insertion mishap 
 
 ● Mission support offices who are interested in maintaining their infrastructure and workforce 
capabilities in their areas of specialized expertise 
 
 Specific expectations include: 
 
 ● The envisioned concept of operations is for a single launch of a scientific platform that will be 
placed in a polar orbit around Planet X 
 
 ● The envisioned scientific platform will include a radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) for 
electrical power generation 
 
 ● The launch date must be within the next 55 months due to the launch window 
 
 ● The scientific platform should provide at least 6 months of data collection 
 
 ● Data collection beyond the initial 6 months is desirable but not mission critical 
 
 ● The scientific platform will include a core data collection capability in terms of data type and 
data quality (for the purpose of this example, the specifics of the data are unspecified) 
 
 ● Collection of additional (unspecified) types of scientific data is desirable if the capability can be 
provided without undue additional costs or mission success impacts 
 
 ● The mission should be as inexpensive as possible, with a cost cap of $500M 
 
 ● The probability of radiological contamination of Planet “X” should be minimized, with a goal of 
no greater than 1 in 1000 (0.1%) 
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An objectives hierarchy is shown notionally in Figure 13. At the first level of decomposition the 
top-level objective is partitioned into the NPR 8000.4A mission execution domains of Safety, 
Technical, Cost, and Schedule. This enables each performance measure and, ultimately, 
performance requirement, to be identified as relating to a single domain. Below each of these 
domains the objectives are further decomposed into sub-objectives, which themselves are 
iteratively decomposed until appropriate quantifiable performance objectives are generated. 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Notional Objectives Hierarchy  
 
There is no prescribed depth to an objectives hierarchy, nor must all performance objectives 
reside at the same depth in the tree. The characteristics of an objectives hierarchy depend on the 
top-level objective and the context in which it is to be pursued. Furthermore, a unique objectives 
hierarchy is not implied by the specification of an objective; many different equally legitimate 
objectives hierarchies could be developed. 
 
When developing an objectives hierarchy there is no obvious stopping point for the 
decomposition of objectives. Judgment must be used to decide where to stop by considering the 
advantages and disadvantages of further decomposition. Things to consider include: 
 
 Are all facets of each objective accounted for? 
 
 Are all the performance objectives at the levels of the hierarchy quantifiable? 
 
 Is the number of performance objectives manageable within the scope of the 
decision-making activity? 
 
One possibility is to use a “test of importance” to deal with the issue of how broadly and deeply 
to develop an objectives hierarchy and when to stop. Before an objective is included in the 
hierarchy, the decision-maker is asked whether he or she feels the best course of action could be 
altered if that objective were excluded. An affirmative response would obviously imply that the 
objective should be included. A negative response would be taken as sufficient reason for 
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exclusion. It is important when using this method to avoid excluding a large set of attributes, 
each of which fails the test of importance but which collectively are important. As the 
decision-making process proceeds and further insight is gained, the test of importance can be 
repeated with the excluded objectives to assure that they remain non-determinative. Otherwise 
they must be added to the hierarchy and evaluated for further decomposition themselves until 
new stopping points are reached. 
 
The decomposition of objectives stops when the set of performance objectives is operationally 
useful and quantifiable, and the decision-maker, in consultation with appropriate stakeholders, is 
satisfied that it captures the expectations contained in the top-level objective. It is desirable that 
the performance objectives have the following properties. They should be: 
 
 Complete – The set of performance objectives is complete if it includes all areas of 
concern embedded in the top-level objective. 
 
 Operational – The performance objectives must be meaningful to the decision-maker so 
that he or she can understand the implications of meeting or not meeting them to various 
degrees. The decision-maker must ultimately be able to articulate a rationale for 
preferring one decision alternative over all others, which requires that he or she be able to 
ascribe value, at least qualitatively, to the degree to which the various alternatives meet 
the performance objectives. 
 
 Non-redundant – The set of performance objectives is non-redundant if no objective 
contains, or significantly overlaps with, another objective. This is not to say that the 
ability of a particular alternative to meet different performance objectives will not be 
correlated. For example, in application, maximize reliability is often negatively correlated 
with minimize cost. Rather, performance objectives should be conceptually distinct, 
regardless of any solution-specific performance dependencies. 
 
 Solution independent – The set of performance objectives should be applicable to any 
reasonable decision alternative and should not presuppose any particular aspect of an 
alternative to the exclusion of other reasonable alternatives. For example, an objectives 
hierarchy for a payload launch capability that had Minimize Slag Formation as a 
performance objective would be presupposing a solid propellant design. Unless solid 
propellant was specifically required based on a prior higher-level decision, Minimize Slag 
Formation would not reflect an unbiased decomposition of the top-level objective. 
 
Guidance on developing objectives hierarchies can be found in Clemen [12] and Keeney and 
Raiffa [13], as well as on websites such as Comparative Risk Assessment Framework and Tools 
(CRAFT) [15]. 
 
Fundamental vs. Means Objectives 
 
When developing an objectives hierarchy it is important to use fundamental objectives as 
opposed to means objectives. Fundamental objectives represent what one wishes to accomplish, 
as opposed to means objectives, which represent how one might accomplish it. Objectives 
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hierarchies decompose high-level fundamental objectives into their constituent parts 
(partitioning), such that the fundamental objectives at the lower level are those that are implied 
by the fundamental objective at the higher level. In contrast, means objectives indicate a 
particular way of accomplishing a higher-level objective. Assessment of decision alternatives in 
terms of fundamental objectives as opposed to means objectives represents a performance-based 
approach to decision making, as recommended by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) 
as emphasizing “early risk identification to guide design, thus enabling creative design 
approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both.” [16].  
 
The difference between fundamental objectives and means objectives is illustrated in Figure 14, 
which shows an objectives hierarchy on the top and a means objectives network on the bottom. 
The first thing to notice is that the objectives hierarchy is just that, a hierarchy. Each level 
decomposes the previous level into a more detailed statement of what the objectives entail. The 
objective, Maximize Safety, is decomposed (by partitioning) into Minimize Loss of Life, Minimize 
Serious Injuries, and Minimize Minor Injuries. The three performance objectives explain what is 
meant by Maximize Safety, without presupposing a particular way of doing so.4 
 
In contrast, the means objectives network is not a decomposition of objectives, which is why it is 
structured as a network instead of a hierarchy. The objective, Educate Public about Safety, does 
not explain what is meant by any one the higher-level objectives; instead, it is a way of 
accomplishing them. Other ways may be equally effective or even more so. Deterministic 
standards in general are means objectives, as they typically prescribe techniques and practices by 
which fundamental objectives, such as safety, will be achieved. Means objectives networks arise 
in another context in the RIDM process and are discussed further in Section 3.2.1. 
 
Performance Measures 
 
Once an objectives hierarchy is completed that decomposes the top-level objective into a 
complete set of quantifiable performance objectives, a performance measure is assigned to each 
as the metric by which its degree of fulfillment is quantified. In many, if not most cases the 
appropriate performance measure to use is self-evident from the objective. In other cases the 
choice may not be as clear, and work must be done in order to assure that the objective is not 
only quantifiable, but that the performance measure used to quantify it is adequately 
representative of the objective to begin with. 
 
Objectives that have natural unit scales (e.g., Minimize Cost, Maximize Payload) are generally 
easy to associate with an appropriate performance measures (e.g., Total Cost or Cost Overrun 
[$], Payload Mass [kg]). Other objectives might not have an obvious or practical natural unit 
scale, thereby requiring the development of either a constructed scale or a proxy performance 
measure.  
 
A constructed scale is typically appropriate for measuring objectives that are essentially 
subjective in character, or for which subjective or linguistic assessment is most appropriate. An 
                                                 
4 NASA is currently developing quantitative safety goals and associated thresholds (akin to imposed constraints) 
that will be used to guide risk acceptance decisions. [17] An example of a quantitative safety goal would be: the risk 
to an astronaut from the ascent phase of a launch to LEO should be less than <a specified value>. 
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example of such an objective might be Maximize Stakeholder Support. Here, stakeholder support 
is the attribute being measured, but there is no natural measurement scale by which an objective 
assessment of stakeholder support can be made. Instead, it might be reasonable to construct a 
scale that supports subjective/linguistic assessment of stakeholder support (see Table 1). 
Constructed scales are also useful as a means of quantifying what is essentially qualitative 
information, thereby allowing it to be integrated into a quantitative risk analysis framework. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Fundamental vs. Means Objectives [19]  
 
Alternatively, it may be possible to identify an objective performance measure that indirectly 
measures the degree of fulfillment of an objective. In the previous paragraph the objective, 
Maximize Stakeholder Support, was assessed subjectively using a Stakeholder Support 
performance measure with a constructed scale. Another strategy for assessing the objective 
might be to define a proxy for stakeholder support, such as the average number of stakeholders 
attending the bi-weekly status meetings. In this case, the proxy performance measure gives an 
indication of stakeholder support that might be operationally adequate for the decision at hand, 
although it does not necessarily correlate exactly to actual stakeholder support. 
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Table 1. A Constructed Scale for Stakeholder Support (Adapted from [12]) 
 
Scale Value Description 
5 Action-oriented Support 
Two or more stakeholders are actively advocating and no 
stakeholders are opposed. 
4 Support No stakeholders are opposed and at least one stakeholder has expressed support. 
3 Neutrality All stakeholders are indifferent or uninterested. 
2 Opposition One or more stakeholders have expressed opposition, although no stakeholder is actively opposing. 
1 Action-oriented Opposition One or more stakeholders are actively opposing. 
 
The relationship between natural, constructed and proxy scales is illustrated in Figure 15 in terms 
of whether or not the performance measure directly or indirectly represents the corresponding 
objective, and whether the assessment is empirically quantifiable or must be subjectively 
assessed. Additionally, Figure 15 highlights the following two characteristics of performance 
measures: 
 
 The choice of performance measure type (natural, constructed, proxy) is not a function of 
the performance measure alone. It is also a function of the performance objective that the 
performance measure is intended to quantify. For example P(LOC) can be considered a 
natural performance measure as applied to astronaut life safety, since it directly addresses 
astronaut casualty expectation. However, in some situations P(LOC) might be a good 
proxy performance measure for overall astronaut health, particularly in situations where 
astronaut injury and/or illness are not directly assessable. 
 
 There is seldom, if ever, a need for an indirect, subjective performance measure. This is 
because performance objectives tend to be intrinsically amenable to direct, subjective 
assessment. Thus, for objectives that do not have natural measurement scales, it is 
generally productive to ask whether the objective is better assessed directly but 
subjectively, or whether it is better to forego direct measurement in exchange for an 
empirically-quantifiable proxy performance measure. The first case leads to a constructed 
performance measure that is direct but perhaps not reproducible; the second to a 
performance measure that is reproducible but may not fully address the corresponding 
performance objective. 
 
A performance measure should be adequate in indicating the degree to which the associated 
performance objective is met. This is generally not a problem for performance measures that 
have natural or constructed scales, but can be a challenge for proxy performance measures. In the 
Maximize Stakeholder Support example above, it is possible that a stakeholder who perceives the 
activity to be an obstacle to his or her real objectives might attend the meetings in order to 
remain informed about potential threats. Thus the average number of stakeholders attending the 
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status meetings might not be an accurate representation of stakeholder support, and in this case 
may have a contraindicative element to it. 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Types of Performance Measures  
 
Figure 16 illustrates the relationship between performance objectives and performance measures. 
A performance measure has been established on each of the performance objectives based on the 
objective’s natural measurement scale, a constructed scale that has been developed for subjective 
quantification, or via a proxy performance measure. 
 
Although it is preferable that a performance measure be directly measurable, this is not always 
possible, even for objectives with natural measurement scales. For example, safety-related risk 
metrics such as Probability of Loss of Mission, P(LOM), and Probability of Loss of Crew, 
P(LOC), are typically used to quantify the objectives Avoid Loss of Mission and Maintain 
Astronaut Health and Safety. These performance measures are the product of modeling activities 
as opposed to direct measurement, involving the integration of numerous parameters within an 
analytical model of the alternative under consideration. In cases such as these, where modeling 
methods are integral to the resultant performance measure values, the modeling protocols 
become part of the performance measure definition. This assures that performance measures are 
calculated consistently. 
 
One proxy performance measure of particular importance to many NASA decisions is 
Flexibility. Flexibility refers to the ability to support more than one current application. A 
technology choice that imposes a hard limit on the mass that can be boosted into a particular 
orbit has less flexibility than a choice that is more easily adaptable to boost more. The objective, 
Maximize Flexibility, allows this type of issue to be addressed systematically in decision making. 
However, since Maximize Flexibility refers to potential capabilities that are as yet undefined, 
there is no natural measurement scale that can be used for quantification.5 A constructed scale is 
possible, although it requires subjective assessment. A proxy performance measure for flexibility 
can be constructed by, for example, assessing the capability of the alternative to support a 
selected set of alternative objectives, such as boosting a larger mass into orbit. 
                                                 
5 In such applications, Flexibility is a surrogate for certain future performance attributes. This idea is discussed more 
extensively by Keeney [18] and Keeney and McDaniels [19]. 
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Figure 16. The Relationship between Performance Objectives and Performance Measures  
 
 
Risk Minimization Is Not a Performance Objective 
 
It is sometimes the practice in decision analyses and trade studies to treat Minimize Risk as a 
distinct performance objective, which is then decomposed into domains such as technology, 
programmatic, cost, and schedule, resulting in performance measures such as technology risk, 
programmatic risk, cost risk, and schedule risk. However, in NPR 8000.4A, risk is the potential 
for shortfalls with respect to performance requirements (which in a RIDM context translates 
operationally into shortfalls with respect to performance commitments). Therefore, Minimize 
Risk is not a distinct objective in the objectives hierarchy. Rather, it is the task of risk 
management itself (including RIDM), for which risk is an attribute of every performance 
objective, as measured by the probability of falling short of its associated performance 
commitment. 
 
For example, if a certain payload capability is contingent on the successful development of a 
particular propulsion technology, then the risk of not meeting the payload performance 
commitment is determined in part by the probability that the technology development program 
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will be unsuccessful. In other words, the risk associated with technology development is 
accounted for in terms of its risk impact on the performance commitments (in this case, payload). 
There is no need to evaluate a separate Technology Risk metric.6 
 
Example Performance Measures 
 
Performance measures should fall within the mission execution domains of safety, technical, cost 
and schedule. Table 2 contains a list of typically important kinds of performance measures for 
planetary spacecraft and launch vehicles. Note that this is by no means a comprehensive and 
complete list. Although such lists can serve as checklists to assure comprehensiveness of the 
derived performance measure set, it must be stressed that performance measures are explicitly 
derived from top-level objectives in the context of stakeholder expectations, and cannot be 
established prescriptively from a predefined set. 
 
Table 2. Performance Measures Examples for Planetary Spacecraft and Launch Vehicles 
 
Performance Measures for 
Planetary Spacecraft 
Performance Measures for 
Launch Vehicles 
 End-of-mission (EOM) dry mass 
 Injected mass (includes EOM dry mass, baseline 
consumables and upper stage adaptor mass) 
 Consumables at EOM 
 Power demand (relative to supply) 
 Onboard data processing memory demand 
 Onboard data processing throughput time 
 Onboard data bus capacity 
 Total pointing error 
 Total vehicle mass at launch 
 Payload mass (at nominal altitude or orbit) 
 Payload volume 
 Injection accuracy 
 Launch reliability 
 In-flight reliability 
 For reusable vehicles, percent of value 
recovered 
 For expendable vehicles, unit production cost 
at the nth unit 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
6 Unless Engage in Technology Development is a performance objective in its own right. 
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Planetary Science Mission Example:  Derive Performance Measures 
 
From the generic top-level objective of “Project Success”, the stakeholder expectations that have been 
captured are organized via an objectives hierarchy that decomposes the top-level objective through 
the mission execution domains of Safety, Technical, Cost, and Schedule, producing a set of 
performance objectives at the leaves. The terminology of “Minimize” and “Maximize” is used as 
appropriate to indicate the “direction of goodness” that corresponds to increasing performance for that 
objective. 
 
 
 
Objectives Hierarchy for the Planetary Science Mission Example 
 
A quantitative performance measure is associated with each performance objective, along with any 
applicable imposed constraints. Below are the performance measures and applicable imposed 
constraints for four of the performance objectives. These are the four performance measures that will 
be quantified for the example in subsequent steps. In practice, all performance objectives are 
quantified. 
 
Selected Performance Measures and Imposed Constraints 
for the Planetary Science Mission Example 
 
 
 
 
Project
Success
Cost ScheduleSafety Technical
Maximize
ground safety
Minimize the
probability of
Planet “X”
Pu contamination
Maximize the
data collection
duration
Maximize the
types of data
collected
Minimize
the cost
Meet the launch
window
Performance Objective Performance Measure Imposed Constraint
Minimize cost Project cost ($M) None
Minimize development time Months to completion 55 months
Minimize the probability of 
Planet “X” Pu contamination
Probability of Planet “X”
Pu contamination 0.1%
Maximize data collection Months of data collection 6 months
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3.1.2 Step 2 - Compile Feasible Alternatives 
 
The objective of Step 2 is to compile a comprehensive list of feasible decision alternatives 
through a discussion of a reasonable range of alternatives. The result is a set of alternatives that 
can potentially achieve objectives and warrant the investment of resources required to analyze 
them further. 
 
3.1.2.1 Compiling an Initial Set of Alternatives 
 
Decision alternatives developed under the design solution definition process [2] are the starting 
point. These may be revised, and unacceptable alternatives removed after deliberation by 
stakeholders based upon criteria such as violation of flight rules, violation of safety standards, 
etc. Any listing of alternatives will by its nature produce both practical and impractical 
alternatives. It would be of little use to seriously consider an alternative that cannot be adopted; 
nevertheless, the initial set of proposed alternatives should be conservatively broad in order to 
reduce the possibility of excluding potentially attractive alternatives from the outset. Keep in 
mind that novel solutions may provide a basis for the granting of exceptions and/or waivers from 
deterministic standards, if it can be shown that the intents of the standards are met, with 
confidence, by other means. In general, it is important to avoid limiting the range of proposed 
alternatives based on prejudgments or biases. 
 
Defining feasible alternatives requires an understanding of the technologies available, or 
potentially available, at the time the system is needed. Each alternative should be documented 
qualitatively in a description sheet. The format of the description sheet should, at a minimum, 
clarify the allocation of required functions to that alternative's lower-level components. The 
discussion should also include alternatives which are capable of avoiding or substantially 
lessening any significant risks, even if these alternatives would be more costly. If an alternative 
would cause one or more significant risk(s) in addition to those already identified, the significant 
effects of the alternative should be discussed as part of the identification process. 
 
Stakeholder involvement is necessary when compiling decision alternatives, to assure that 
legitimate ideas are considered and that no stakeholder feels unduly disenfranchised from the 
decision process. It is expected that interested parties will have their own ideas about what 
constitutes an optimal solution, so care should be taken to actively solicit input. However, the 
initial set of alternatives need not consider those that are purely speculative. The alternatives 
should be limited to those that are potentially fruitful. 
 
3.1.2.2 Structuring Possible Alternatives (e.g., Trade Trees) 
 
One way to represent decision alternatives under consideration is by a trade tree. Initially, the 
trade tree contains a number of high-level decision alternatives representing high-level 
differences in the strategies used to address objectives. The tree is then developed in greater 
detail by determining a general category of options that are applicable to each strategy. Trade 
tree development continues iteratively until the leaves of the tree contain alternatives that are 
well enough defined to allow quantitative evaluation via risk analysis (see Section 3.2).  
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Along the way, branches of the trade tree containing unattractive categories can be pruned, as it 
becomes evident that the alternatives contained therein are either infeasible (i.e., they are 
incapable of satisfying the imposed constraints) or categorically inferior to alternatives on other 
branches. An alternative that is inferior to some other alternative with respect to every 
performance measure is said to be dominated by the superior alternative. At this point in the 
RIDM process, assessment of performance is high-level, depending on simplified analysis and/or 
expert opinion, etc. When performance measure values are quantified, they are done so as point 
estimates, using a conservative approach to estimation in order to err on the side of inclusion 
rather than elimination. 
  
Figure 17 presents an example launch vehicle trade tree from the Exploration Systems 
Architecture Study (ESAS) [20]. At each node of the tree the alternatives were evaluated for 
feasibility within the cost and schedule constraints of the study’s ground rules and assumptions. 
Infeasible options were pruned (shown in red), focusing further analytical attention on the 
retained branches (shown in green). The key output of this step is a set of alternatives deemed to 
be worth the effort of analyzing with care. Alternatives in this set have two key properties: 
 
 They do not violate imposed constraints 
 
 They are not known to be dominated by other alternatives (i.e., there is no other 
alternative in the set that is superior in every way). 
 
Alternatives found to violate either of these properties can be screened out. 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Example Launch Vehicle Trade Tree from ESAS  
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Planetary Science Mission Example:  Compile Feasible Alternatives 
 
A trade tree approach was used to develop potential alternatives for the mission to Planet “X”. As 
shown in the trade tree below, the three attributes that were traded were the orbital insertion method 
(propulsive deceleration vs. aerocapture), the science package (lighter, low-fidelity instrumentation vs. 
heavier, high-fidelity instrumentation), and the launch vehicle (small, medium, and large). However, 
initial estimates of payload mass indicated that there was only one appropriately matched launch 
vehicle option to each combination of insertion method and science package. Thus, eight of the twelve 
initial options were screened out as being “infeasible” (as indicated by the red X’s), leaving four 
alternatives to be forwarded to risk analysis (alternatives 1 – 4). 
 
Trade Tree of Planetary Science Mission Alternatives 
 
 
Feasible Alternatives forwarded to Risk Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
MediumHigh FidelityAerocapture4
SmallLow FidelityAerocapture3
LargeHigh FidelityPropulsive Insertion2
MediumLow FidelityPropulsive Insertion1
Launch Vehicle SizeScience PackageOrbital Insertion TechnologyAlt #
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3.2 Part 2 – Risk Analysis of Alternatives 
 
Risk analysis consists of performance assessment supported by probabilistic modeling. It links 
the uncertainties inherent in a particular decision alternative to uncertainty in the achievement of 
objectives, were that decision alternative to be pursued. Performance is assessed in terms of the 
performance objectives developed in Step 1. The performance measures established for these 
objectives provide the means of quantifying performance so that alternatives can be effectively 
compared. 
 
Figure 18 illustrates Part 2 of the RIDM process, Risk Analysis of Alternatives. In Step 3, risk 
analysis methodologies are selected for each analysis domain represented in the objectives, and 
coordination among the analysis activities is established to ensure a consistent, integrated 
evaluation of each alternative. In Step 4, the risk analysis is conducted, which entails 
probabilistic evaluation of each alternative’s performance measure values, iterating the analysis 
at higher levels of resolution as needed to clearly distinguish performance among the 
alternatives. Then the TBfD is developed, which provides the primary means of risk-informing 
the subsequent selection process. 
 
 
 
Figure 18. RIDM Process Part 2, Risk Analysis of Alternatives  
 
 
3.2.1 Step 3 – Set the Framework and Choose the Analysis Methodologies 
 
This step of the RIDM process is concerned with how domain-specific analyses, conducted in 
accordance with existing methodological practices, are integrated into a multidisciplinary 
framework to support decision making under uncertainty. In general, each mission execution 
domain has a suite of analysis methodologies available to it that range in cost, complexity, and 
time to execute, and which produce results that vary from highly uncertain rough 
• Structure the multidisciplinary analysis process
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• Determine each alternative’s performance
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• Maintain configuration control
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and Document the Results
Part 2 - Risk Analysis of Alternatives
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Choose the Analysis Methodologies
Technical Basis 
for Deliberation
From Part 1
• Feasible alternatives
• Performance measures
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• Construct scenarios and identify uncertainties
• Quantify performance measures
probabilistically
• Perform sensitivity studies
• Downselect alternatives for additional
analysis
• Develop the Technical Basis for Deliberation
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order-of-magnitude (ROM) estimates to the detailed simulations. The challenge for the risk 
analysts is to establish a framework for analysis across mission execution domains that: 
 
 Operates on a common set of (potentially uncertain) performance parameters for a given 
alternative (e.g., the cost model uses the same mass data as the lift capacity model); 
 
 Consistently addresses uncertainties across mission execution domains and across 
alternatives (e.g., budget uncertainties, meteorological variability); 
 
 Preserves correlations between performance measures (discussed further in 
Section 3.2.2); and 
 
 Is transparent and traceable. 
 
The means by which a given level of performance will be achieved is alternative specific, and 
accordingly, the analyses that are required to support quantification are also alternative specific. 
For example, one alternative might meet the objective of Minimize Crew Fatalities by 
developing a high reliability system with high margins and liberal use of redundancy, eliminating 
the need for an abort capability. Since the high mass associated with the high margins of this 
approach impacts the objective, Maximize Payload Capacity, a different alternative might 
address the same crew safety objective by combining a lighter, less reliable system with an 
effective crew abort capability. For these two alternatives, significantly different analyses would 
need to be performed to quantify the probability P(LOC) of accomplishing the crew safety 
performance measure. In the first case, P(LOC) is directly related to system reliability. In the 
second case, reliability analysis plays a significant part, but additional analysis is needed to 
quantify abort effectiveness, which involves analysis of system responsiveness to the failure, and 
survivability given the failure environment. 
 
 
Performance Parameters 
 
A performance parameter is any value needed to execute the models that quantify the 
performance measures. Unlike performance measures, which are the same for all alternatives, 
performance parameters typically vary among alternatives, i.e., a performance parameter that is 
defined for one alternative might not apply to another alternative. 
 
Example performance parameters related to the performance objective of lofting X lbs into low 
Earth orbit (LEO) might include propellant type, propellant mass, engine type/specifications, 
throttle level, etc. Additionally, performance parameters also include relevant environmental 
characteristics such as meteorological conditions. 
 
Performance parameters may be uncertain. Indeed, risk has its origins in performance parameter 
uncertainty, which propagates through the risk analysis, resulting in performance measure 
uncertainty. 
 
 
 
3.2.1.1 Structuring the Analysis Process 
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For a given alternative, the relationship between performance measures and the analyses needed 
to quantify them can be established and illustrated using a means objectives network (introduced 
in Section 3.1.1). Figure 19, adapted from [21], illustrates the idea. This figure traces 
Performance Parameter 1 through the risk analysis framework, showing how it is used by 
multiple risk analyses in multiple mission execution domains. 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Risk Analysis Framework (Alternative Specific)  
 
For example, Performance Parameter 1 is a direct input to a risk analysis in the Cost and 
Schedule mission execution domains (which have been combined in the figure for convenience). 
This analysis produces outputs that are used as inputs to two other Cost and Schedule risk 
analyses. One of these risk analyses produces a value for Performance Measure 1, whereas the 
other risk analysis produces an output that is needed by a risk analysis in the Safety mission 
execution domain. This Safety risk analysis ultimately supports quantification of Performance 
Measure n. 
 
Each of the m performance parameters that defines Alternative i can be similarly traced through 
the risk analysis framework. 
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Figure 19 illustrates the need for coordination among the organizations conducting the analyses 
to assure that: 
 
 There is an organization responsible for the quantification of each performance measure; 
 
 The data requirements for every risk analysis are understood and the data sources and 
destinations have been identified; 
 
 All data are traceable back through the risk analysis framework to the performance 
parameters of the analyzed alternative. 
 
3.2.1.2 Configuration Control 
 
It is important to maintain consistency over the definition of each analyzed alternative to ensure 
that all involved parties are working from a common data set. This is particularly true during the 
earlier phases of the program/project life cycle where designs may be evolving rapidly as 
decisions are made that narrow the trade space and extend it to higher levels of detail. It is also 
true when decisions are revisited, such as during requirements rebaselining (as discussed in 
Section 2.2), in which case the complete definition of the alternative may be distributed among 
various organizational units at different levels of the NASA hierarchy. In this case it is necessary 
for the organization at the level of the decision to be made to consolidate all relevant alternative 
data at its own level, as well as levels below, into a configuration managed data set. 
 
Additionally, the risk analysis framework itself must be configuration controlled, in terms of the 
analyses (e.g., version number) and data pathways. 
 
3.2.1.3 Implementing a Graded Approach in Selecting Risk Analysis Methods 
 
The spectrum of analysis disciplines involved in the risk analysis of alternatives is as broad as 
the spectrum of performance measures, spanning the mission execution domains of Safety, 
Technical, Cost, and Schedule. It is not the intent of this handbook to provide detailed guidance 
on the conduct of domain-specific analyses. Such guidance is available in domain-specific 
documents like NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements [22] (Chapter 2, 
System Safety), the NASA Cost Estimating Handbook [23], the NASA Systems Engineering 
Handbook [2], and the NASA Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide [24].  
 
Depending on project scale, life cycle phase, etc., different levels of analysis are appropriate. The 
rigor of analysis should be enough to assess compliance with imposed constraints and support 
selection between alternatives. Iteration is to be expected as part of the analysis process, but as a 
general rule of thumb, the rigor of analysis should increase with successive program/project life 
cycle phases. In addition for a given phase, parametric, engineering, and logic modeling can 
commence at a low level of detail; the level of detail can be increased in an iterative fashion 
based on the requirement to reach a robust decision. Figure 20 indicates the types of analysis that 
are generally appropriate, as a function of life cycle phase, for cost, technical, and safety 
estimation. Discussion of uncertainty can be found in Section 3.2.2. Detailed information on 
methods can be found in discipline-specific guidance, e.g., [2], [23], and [24]. 
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Figure 20. Analysis Methodology Guidance Chart  
 
 Cost and Schedule Estimating Methodologies: 
 
o Analogy Estimating Methodology - Analogy estimates are performed on the basis 
of comparison and extrapolation to like items or efforts. Cost data from one past 
program that is technically representative of the program to be estimated serves as 
the basis of estimate. These data are then subjectively adjusted upward or 
downward, depending upon whether the subject system is believed to be more or 
less complex than the analogous program. 
 
o Parametric Estimating - Estimates created using a parametric approach are based 
on historical data and mathematical expressions relating cost as the dependent 
variable to selected, independent, cost-driving variables through regression 
analysis. Generally, an estimator selects parametric estimating when only a few 
key pieces of data are known, such as weight and volume. The implicit 
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assumption of parametric estimating is that the same forces that affected cost in 
the past will affect cost in the future. 
 
o Engineering Build Up Methodology - Sometimes referred to as “grass roots” or 
“bottom-up” estimating, the engineering build up methodology rolls up individual 
estimates for each element into the overall estimate. This methodology involves 
the computation of the cost of a work breakdown structure (WBS) element by 
estimating at the lowest level of detail (often referred to as the “work package” 
level) wherein the resources to accomplish the work effort are readily 
distinguishable and discernable. Often the labor requirements are estimated 
separately from material requirements. Overhead factors for cost elements such as 
Other Direct Costs (ODCs), General and Administrative (G&A) expenses, 
materials burden, and fees are generally applied to the labor and materials costs to 
complete the estimate. 
 
 Estimating Methodologies for Technical Performance Measures: 
 
o First-Order Estimating Methodology - First-order estimates involve the use of 
closed-form or simple differential equations which can be solved given 
appropriate bounding conditions and/or a desired outcome without the need for 
control-volume based computational methods. The equations may be standard 
physics equations of state or empirically-derived relationships from operation of 
similar systems or components. 
 
o Detailed Simulation Estimating Methodology - Estimates using a detailed 
simulation require the construction of a model that represents the physical states 
of interest in a virtual manner using control-volume based computational methods 
or methods of a similar nature. These simulations typically require systems and 
conditions to be modeled to a high-level of fidelity and the use of “meshes” or 
network diagrams to represent the system, its environment (either internal, 
external, or both), and/or processes acting on the system or environment. 
Examples are computational fluid dynamics (CFD) and finite-element modeling. 
 
o Testing Methodology - Testing can encompass the use of table-top experiments all 
the way up to full-scale prototypes operated under real-world conditions. The 
objective of the test is to measure how the system or its constituent components 
may perform within actual mission conditions. Testing could be used for 
assessing the expected performance of competing concepts or for evaluating that 
the system or components will meet flight specifications. 
 
o Operating Experience Methodology - Once the system is deployed data gathered 
during operation can be analyzed to provide empirically accurate representations 
of how the system will respond to different conditions and how it will operate 
throughout its lifetime. This information can serve as the basis for applicable 
changes, such as software uploads or procedural changes, that may improve the 
overall performance of the system. Testing and detailed simulation may be 
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combined with operating experience to extrapolate from known operating 
conditions. 
 
 Safety, Reliability, & Operations Estimating Methodologies: 
 
o Similarity Estimating Methodology - Similarity estimates are performed on the 
basis of comparison and extrapolation to like items or efforts. Reliability and 
operational data from one past program that is technically representative of the 
program to be estimated serves as the basis of estimate. Reliability and 
operational data are then subjectively adjusted upward or downward, depending 
upon whether the subject system is believed to be more or less complex than the 
analogous program. 
 
o First-Order Parametric Estimation - Estimates created using a parametric 
approach are based on historical data and mathematical expressions relating 
safety, reliability, and/or operational estimates as the dependent variable to 
selected, independent, driving variables through either regression analysis or 
first-order technical equations (e.g., higher pressures increase the likelihood of 
tank rupture). Generally, an estimator selects parametric estimating when the 
system and its concept of operation are at the conceptual stage. The implicit 
assumption of parametric estimating is that the same factors that shaped the 
safety, reliability, and operability in the past will affect the system/components 
being assessed. 
 
o Detailed Logic Modeling Estimation - Detailed logic modeling estimation 
involves “top-down” developed but “bottom-up” quantified scenario-based or 
discrete-event logic models that segregate the system or processes to be evaluated 
into discrete segments that are then quantified and mathematically integrated 
through Boolean logic to produce the top-level safety, reliability, or operational 
estimate. Detailed technical simulation and/or testing, as well as operational data, 
can be used to assist in developing pdfs for quantification of the model. Typical 
methods for developing such models may include the use of fault trees, influence 
diagrams, and/or event trees. 
 
o Statistical Methods - Statistical methods can applied to data collected during 
system/component testing or from system operation during an actual mission. 
This is useful for characterizing the demonstrated safety, reliability, or operability 
of the system. In addition, patterns in the data may be modeled in a way that 
accounts for randomness and uncertainty in the observations, and then serve as 
the basis for design or procedural changes that may improve the overall safety, 
reliability, or operability of the system. These methods are useful for answering 
yes/no questions about the data (hypothesis testing), describing associations 
within the data (correlation), modeling relationships within the data (regression), 
extrapolation, interpolation, or simply for data mining activities. 
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3.2.1.4 Implementing a Graded Approach in Quantifying Individual Scenarios 
 
In addition to increasing with successive program/project life cycle phases and the level of 
design detail available, the level of rigor in the analysis should increase with the importance of 
the scenario being evaluated.  Regardless of the time during the life cycle, certain scenarios will 
not be as important as others in affecting the performance measures that can be achieved for a 
given alternative.  Scenarios that can be shown to have very low likelihood of occurrence and/or 
very low impacts on all the mission execution domains do not have to be evaluated using a 
rigorous simulation methodology or a full-blown accounting of the uncertainties.  A point-
estimate analysis using reasonably conservative simulation models and input parameter values 
should be sufficient for the evaluation of such scenarios. 
 
3.2.1.5 Use of Existing Analyses 
 
The RIDM process does not imply a need for a whole new set of analyses. In general, some of 
the necessary analyses will already be planned or implemented as part of the systems 
engineering, cost estimating, and safety and mission assurance (S&MA) activities. Risk analysis 
for RIDM should take maximum advantage of existing activities, while also influencing them as 
needed in order to produce results that address objectives, at an appropriate level of rigor to 
support robust decision making. 
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Planetary Science Mission Example:  Set the Analysis Framework 
 
The figure below shows the risk analysis framework used to integrate the domain-specific analyses. 
Each alternative is characterized by its performance parameters, some of which are uncertain (shown 
in red text) and others of which have definite, known deterministic values (shown in black text). In 
order to calculate the performance measures previously selected for illustrative purposes, four 
separate performance models have been developed for radiological contamination, data collection, 
schedule, and cost. Some performance parameters, such as spacecraft structure mass, launch 
reliability, and science package TRL, are used in multiple models. Some models (e.g., the data 
collection model) produce outputs (e.g., science package mass) that are inputs to other models (e.g., 
the schedule model). 
 
 
Risk Analysis Framework 
 
 
The analysis framework shown above was used for all four alternatives selected for risk analysis. 
However, in general, each alternative may require its own analysis framework, which may differ 
substantially from other alternatives’ frameworks based on physical or operational differences in the 
alternatives themselves. When this is the case, care should be taken to assure analytical consistency 
among alternatives in order to support valid comparisons. 
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3.2.2 Step 4 – Conduct the Risk Analysis and Document the Results 
 
Once the risk analysis framework is established and risk analysis methods determined, 
performance measures can be quantified. As discussed previously, however, this is just the start 
of an iterative process of successive analysis refinement driven by stakeholder and 
decision-maker needs (see Part 3 of the RIDM process). 
 
3.2.2.1 Probabilistic Modeling of Performance 
 
If there were no uncertainty, the question of performance assessment would be one of 
quantifying point value performance measures for each decision alternative. In the real world, 
however, uncertainty is unavoidable, and the consequences of selecting a particular decision 
alternative cannot be known with absolute precision. When the decision involves a course of 
action there is uncertainty in the unfolding of events, however well planned, that can affect the 
achievement of objectives. Budgets can shift, overruns can occur, technology development 
activities can encounter unforeseen phenomena (and often do). Even when the outcome is 
realized, uncertainty will still remain. Reliability and safety cannot be known absolutely, given 
finite testing and operational experience. The limits of phenomenological variability in system 
performance can likewise not be known absolutely nor can the range of conditions under which a 
system will have to operate. All this is especially true at NASA, which operates on the cutting 
edge of scientific understanding and technological capability. 
 
For decision making under uncertainty, risk analysis is necessary, in which uncertainties in the 
values of each alternative’s performance parameters are identified and propagated through the 
analysis to produce uncertain performance measures (see Figure 6 in Section 1.5). Moreover, 
since performance measures might not be independent, correlation must be considered. For 
example, given that labor tends to constitute a high fraction of the overall cost of many NASA 
activities, cost and schedule tend to be highly correlated. High costs tend to be associated with 
slipped schedules, whereas lower costs tend to be associated with on-time execution of the 
program/project plan. 
 
One way to preserve correlations is to conduct all analysis within a common Monte Carlo “shell” 
that samples from the common set of uncertain performance parameters, propagates them 
through the suite of analyses, and collects the resulting performance measures as a vector of 
performance measure values [25]. As the Monte Carlo shell iterates, these performance measure 
vectors accumulate in accordance with the parent joint pdf that is defined over the entire set of 
performance measures. Figure 21 notionally illustrates the Monte Carlo sampling procedure as it 
would be applied to a single decision alternative (Decision Alternative i). 
 
Uncertainties are distinguished by two categorical groups: aleatory and epistemic [26], [27]. 
Aleatory uncertainties are random or stochastic in nature and cannot be reduced by obtaining 
more knowledge through testing or analysis. Examples include: 
 
 The room-temperature properties of the materials used in a specific vehicle. 
 
 The scenario(s) that will occur on a particular flight. 
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In the first case, there is random variability caused by the fact that two different material samples 
will not have the same exact properties even though they are fabricated in the same manner. In 
the second case, knowing the mean failure rates for all the components with a high degree of 
certainty will not tell us which random failures, if any, will actually occur during a particular 
flight. On the other hand, epistemic uncertainties are not random in nature and can be reduced by 
obtaining more knowledge through testing and analysis. Examples include: 
 
 The properties of a material at very high temperatures and pressures that are beyond the 
capability of an experimental apparatus to simulate. 
 
 The mean failure rates of new-technology components that have not been exhaustively 
tested to the point of failure in flight environments. 
 
 
 
Figure 21. Risk Analysis Using a Monte Carlo Sampling Procedure  
 
In both cases, the uncertainty is caused by missing or incomplete knowledge or by limitations in 
the models used to make predictions. 
 
The assessed performance of an alternative is affected by both types of uncertainty in basically 
the same way. That is to say, if there were no epistemic uncertainties there would still be 
uncertainty in the assessed performance because of the unpredictability of performance 
parameters that are subject to aleatory uncertainty. Likewise, if there were no aleatory 
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uncertainties there would still be uncertainty in the assessed performance caused by the 
possibility of our mischaracterizing reality due to imperfect information. 
 
It has become common in risk analysis to separate these two contributions to uncertainty by 
using the term risk to reflect the variability caused by aleatory uncertainties alone, and the term 
risk uncertainty or simply uncertainty to reflect the impreciseness of our knowledge of the risk 
caused by epistemic uncertainties alone. This distinction is useful for deciding whether 
additional research is worth the cost that it would entail, but is not as important for distinguishing 
between different architectural or design alternatives. Therefore, for purposes of the RIDM 
process, we speak only of uncertainties in the broad sense and do not distinguish between their 
aleatory and epistemic parts. However, the analyst always has the option of keeping aleatory and 
epistemic uncertainties separate from one another if he or she desires to do so, and in CRM 
where mitigation options are considered, this separation can be essential. 
 
Further arguments about the relative advantages of combining aleatory and epistemic 
uncertainties versus keeping them separate may be found in [28]. 
 
3.2.2.2 Use of Qualitative Information in RIDM 
 
As discussed in the preceding section, uncertainties in the forecasted performance measures are 
caused by uncertainties in the input performance parameters and in the models that are used to 
calculate the outcomes. These parameter and modeling uncertainties may be expressed in either 
quantitative or qualitative terms. If a parameter is fundamentally quantitative in nature, it is 
represented as having an uncertainty distribution that is expressed in terms of numerical values. 
For example, the date that a part is delivered is a quantitative performance parameter because it 
is defined in terms of the number of days between a reference date (e.g., the project’s initiation) 
and the delivery date. The date has a discrete numerical distribution because it changes in 24-
hour increments. Most performance parameters, such as the cost of the part or its failure rate, 
have continuous numerical distributions. 
 
A performance parameter can often also be expressed in terms of a constructed scale that is 
qualitative in nature. For example, the technology readiness level (TRL) at the time of project 
initiation is a qualitative parameter because it is defined in terms of ranks that are based on non-
numerical information. A TRL of 1, for example, is defined by terms such as: “basic principles 
observed and reported,” “transition from scientific research to applied research,” “essential 
characteristics and behaviors of systems and architectures,” “descriptive tools are mathematical 
formulations or algorithms.” Such terms are not amenable to quantitative analysis without a 
significant amount of interpretation on the part of the analysts. 
 
While the performance parameter may be either quantitative or qualitative, the probability scale 
for the uncertainty distribution of the performance parameter is generally defined in a 
quantitative manner. The probability scale may be either continuous or discrete (although in most 
cases it is continuous). For example, a five-tiered discretization of probabilities on a logarithmic 
scale might be based on binning the probabilities into the following ranges: 10-5 to 10-4 for level 
1, 10-4 to 10-3 for level 2, 10-3 to 10-2 for level 3, 10-2 to 10-1 for level 4, and 10-1 to 100 for level 
5. It could be argued that the probability levels could also be defined in verbal terms such as 
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“very unlikely to happen,” “moderately likely to happen,” and “very likely to happen.” While 
these definitions are not numerical as stated, it is usually possible to ascertain the numerical 
ranges that the analyst has in mind when making these assignments. Thus, the probability should 
be relatable to a quantitative scale. 
 
Various types of quantitative and qualitative uncertainty distributions for the input parameters 
and conditions are shown in Figure 22. Three of these (the top left and right charts and the lower 
right chart within the first bracket) are types of probability density functions, whereas the fourth 
chart (lower left) is a form of a complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF). Either 
form of distribution (density form or cumulative form) may be used to express uncertainty. The 
choice is governed by whichever is the easier to construct, based on the content of the 
uncertainty information. 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Uncertain Performance Parameters Leading to Performance Measure 
Histograms 
 
As depicted in Figure 22, the values of the output performance measures, as opposed to the 
values of the input performance parameters, are always quantitative in that they are defined in 
terms of numerical metrics. The output uncertainty distributions are expressed in the form of a 
histogram representation of output values obtained from Monte Carlo sampling of the input 
values and conditions. 
 
Because the numerically based models are set up to accept numerical inputs, execution of the 
models for calculating the output performance measures is in general easier if all the 
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performance parameters are defined in terms of quantitative scales, whether continuous or 
discrete. Caution should be used where one or more of the inputs are defined in terms of a 
qualitative, or constructed, scale. In these cases, the calculation of the performance measures 
may require that different models be used depending on the rank of the qualitative input. For 
example, the initial TRL for an engine might depend upon whether it can be made out of 
aluminum or has to be made out of beryllium. In this case, an aluminum engine has a higher TRL 
than a beryllium engine because the former is considered a heritage engine and the latter a 
developmental engine. On the other hand, a beryllium engine has the potential for higher thrust 
because it can run at higher temperatures. The model for calculating performance measures such 
as engine start-up reliability, peak thrust, launch date, and project cost would likely be different 
for an aluminum engine than for a beryllium engine. 
 
3.2.2.3 Risk Analysis Support of Robust Decision Making 
 
Because the purpose of risk analysis in RIDM is to support decision making, the adequacy of the 
analysis methods must be determined in that context. The goal is a robust decision, where the 
decision-maker is confident that the selected decision alternative is actually the best one, given 
the state of knowledge at the time. This requires the risk analysis to be rigorous enough to 
discriminate between alternatives, especially for those performance measures that are 
determinative to the decision. 
 
Figure 23 illustrates two hypothetical situations, both of which involve a decision situation 
having just one performance measure of significance. The graph on the left side of the figure 
shows a situation where Alternative 2 is clearly better than Alternative 1 (assuming that the pdfs 
are independent of each other) because the bulk of its pdf is to the left of Alternative 1’s pdf. 
Thus the decision to select Alternative 2 is robust because there is high probability that a random 
sample from Alternative 1’s pdf would perform better than a random sample from 
Alternative 2’s pdf. In contrast, the graph on the right side of the figure shows a situation where 
the mean value of Alternative 1’s performance measure is better than the mean value of 
Alternative 2’s, but their pdfs overlap to a degree that prevents the decision to select 
Alternative 1 from being robust; that is, unless the pdfs for Alternatives 1 and 2 are highly 
correlated, there is a significant probability that Alternative 2 is actually better. The issue of 
correlated pdfs will be taken up later in this section. 
 
For decisions involving multiple objectives and performance measures, it is not always possible 
to identify a priori which measures will be determinative to the decision and which will only be 
marginally influential. It is possible that some performance measures would require extensive 
analysis in order to distinguish between alternatives, even though the distinction would 
ultimately not be material to the decision. Consequently, the need for additional analysis for the 
purpose of making such distinctions comes from the deliberators and the decision-maker, as they 
deliberate the merits and drawbacks of the alternatives. The judgment of whether uncertainty 
reduction would clarify a distinction between contending decision alternatives is theirs to make; 
if it would be beneficial and if additional analysis is practical and effective towards that purpose, 
then the risk analysis is iterated and the results are updated accordingly. 
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Figure 23. Robustness and Uncertainty 
 
 
3.2.2.4 Sequential Analysis and Downselection 
 
While the ultimate selection of any given alternative rests squarely with the decision maker, he 
or she may delegate preliminary downselection authority to a local proxy decision-maker, in 
order to reduce the number of contending alternatives as early as practical in the decision-making 
process. There is no formula for downselection; it is an art whose practice benefits from 
experience. In general it is prudent to continuously screen the alternatives throughout the 
process. It is important to document the basis for eliminating such alternatives from further 
consideration at the time they are eliminated. Two such bases that were discussed in Section 
3.1.2 are infeasibility and dominance. Additional discussion of downselection is presented in 
Section 3.3.2. 
 
Downselection often involves the conduct of sequential analyses, each of which is followed by a 
pruning of alternatives. In this way, alternatives that are clearly unfavorable due to their 
performance on one (or few) performance measures can be eliminated from further analysis once 
those values are quantified. 
 
For example, a lunar transportation architecture with Earth orbit rendezvous will require some 
level of loiter capability for the element(s) that are launched first (excluding simultaneous-launch 
options). A trade tree of architecture options might include a short loiter branch and a long loiter 
branch, corresponding to the times needed to span different numbers of trans-lunar injection 
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(TLI) windows. It may not be known, prior to analysis, that the effects of propellant boil-off in 
terms of increased propellant needs, tankage, structure, and lift capacity, are prohibitive and 
render the long loiter option unfavorable. However, this circumstance can be determined based 
on an assessment of boil-off rate, and a sizing analysis for the architecture in the context of its 
DRMs. Once an analysis of sufficient rigor is performed, the entire long loiter branch of the trade 
tree can be pruned, without the need for additional, higher-level-of-rigor analyses on the 
potentially large number of long loiter alternatives compiled in Step 3 of the RIDM process. 
 
Within the constraints of the analytical dependencies established by the risk analysis framework 
set in the previous step, it may be prudent to order the conduct of domain-specific analyses in a 
manner that exploits the potential for pruning alternatives prior to forwarding them for additional 
analysis. There is no hard rule for an optimal ordering; it depends on the specific decision being 
made, the alternatives compiled, and the analysis methods employed. It is recommended that 
opportunities for sequential analysis and downselection be looked for as alternatives are 
analyzed, and that the ordering of analyses be adjusted as appropriate to facilitate downselection, 
depending on which performance measures can be used as a basis for pruning (see Figure 24). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Downselection of Alternatives 
 
Sequential analysis and downselection requires active collaboration among the risk analysts, the 
deliberators and the decision maker. It is not the role of the risk analysts to eliminate alternatives 
except on the grounds of infeasibility. Sequential downselection, like all decision making, must 
be done in the context of stakeholder values and decision-maker responsibility/accountability. 
 
Additionally, there is a potential vulnerability to sequential downselection, due to the incomplete 
quantification of performance measures it entails. It assumes that for the pruned alternatives, the 
level of performance in the analyzed domains is so poor that no level of performance in the 
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unanalyzed domains could possibly make up for it. If this is not actually the case, an alternative 
that is attractive overall might be screened out due to inferior performance in just one particular 
area, despite superior performance in other domains and overall. Thus, it is good practice to 
review the validity of the downselects, in the context of the selected alternative, in order to 
assure that the selected alternative is indeed dominant.  
 
3.2.2.5 Model Uncertainty and Sensitivity Studies 
 
As is the case with all modeling activities, risk modeling typically entails a degree of model 
uncertainty to the extent that there is a lack of correspondence between the model and the 
alternative being modeled. 
 
Many papers have been written on the subject of characterizing and quantifying model 
uncertainties; for example, surveys may be found in [29] and [30]. Often, the approaches 
advocate the use of expert judgment to formulate uncertainty distributions for the results from 
the models. 
 
For example, suppose there was an existing model that produced a point value for thrust (a 
performance measure) based on a correlation of experimental data. In developing the correlation, 
the analysts emphasized the data points that produced lower thrust values over those that 
produced higher values in keeping with engineering practice to seek a realistically conservative 
result. In addition, the correlation was further biased to lower values to account for the fact that 
the experiments did not duplicate the high temperature, high pressure environment that is 
experienced during flight. A modified model was also derived that was similar to the original 
model but did not include any biasing of the data to produce a conservative result. 
 
Based on this evidence, a set of subject matter experts made the following judgments: 
 
 There is a 95% likelihood that the thrust during an actual flight will be higher than that 
predicted by the first model, which is known to be conservative. 
 
 There is a 25% likelihood that the actual thrust will be higher than what is being 
predicted by the modified model, because the model does not introduce conservative 
assumptions in the data analysis, and in addition the experimental simulation does not 
cover a range of environments where certain phenomena could decrease the thrust. 
 
 There is only a 1% likelihood that the thrust will be lower than 0.8 times the values 
predicted by the original model, because there are no data to indicate that the thrust could 
be so low. 
 
 There is a 1% likelihood that the thrust will be higher than 1.4 times the values predicted 
by the modified model because neither the original nor the modified model accounts for 
catalysis effects which could increase the thrust by up to 40%. 
 
The analysts take this information to create a continuous distribution for the ratio of the actual 
thrust to that predicted by the original model (Figure 25). Thus, the modeling uncertainty for 
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thrust is characterized by an adjustment factor that has a defined uncertainty distribution and is 
applied directly to the model output. 
 
 
 
Figure 25. Conceptualization of the Formulation of Modeling Uncertainty  
 
The technique described above, where one or more models is subjectively assessed for bias as a 
means of quantifying model uncertainty, can in some sense be considered part of the overall 
modeling effort, as opposed to being a follow-on process that is applied to the risk model results. 
It is generically applicable in situations where subjective expertise, above and beyond that which 
is already captured in the available models, can be brought to bear to construct a “meta” model 
that integrates the information that is available from potentially diverse sources. 
 
Another means of assuring that decisions are robust with respect to model uncertainty is to 
conduct sensitivity studies over ranges of credible model forms and/or parameter values. 
Sensitivity studies are particularly pertinent for models that produce point value performance 
measure results, even when the performance measure is known to be uncertain. In these cases, it 
is valuable to determine the sensitivity of the decision to bounding variations in the risk model 
assumptions. Figure 26 notionally presents the results of such a study. It shows how the preferred 
alternative varies as a function of assumptions about contractor support cost rate and payload 
mass. For example, if the contractor support cost rate is 120 and the payload mass is 18, then 
Alternative A is the preferred alternative. If, however, the assumed payload mass is 4, then 
Alternative B is preferable. More generally, if “Alternative B” is preferred for all reasonable 
values of contractor support cost rate and payload mass, then the decision is robust in favor of 
Alternative B (with respect to these parameters), without the need for additional rigor in 
determining the actual contractor support cost rate or payload mass. Likewise, if the reasonable 
range of these parameters falls entirely within the region “Alternative A,” then the decision is 
robust for Alternative A. Only when the reasonable range of values straddles more than one 
region is more rigorous characterization of contractor support cost and payload mass needed for 
robust decision making. 
 
3.2.2.6 Analysis Outputs 
 
Like the variation in risk analysis methods, the analysis results presentation for RIDM may vary, 
depending on the nature of the problem being evaluated. Consequently, there can be no one 
standard analysis output. Instead, the results are tailored to the problem and the needs of the 
deliberation process. Consideration should be given for providing a variety of results, including: 
 
 Scenario descriptions 
Probability 
Density
Vehicle Thrust Divided by Original Model Prediction
1.00.8 (t) 1.4 (t)
(t) is the predicted thrust 
from the modified model 
divided by the predicted 
thrust from the original 
model at time t
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 Performance measure pdfs and statistics 
 
 Risk results (e.g., risk of not meeting imposed constraints) 
 
 Uncertainty analyses and sensitivity studies 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26. Notional Depiction of Decision Sensitivity to Input Parameters 
 
It is important to note that the risk analysis results are expected to mature and evolve as the 
analysis iterates with the participation of the stakeholders and the decision-maker. This is not 
only due to increasing rigor of analysis as the stakeholders and the decision-maker strive for 
decision robustness. Additionally, as they establish firm performance commitments, it becomes 
possible to evaluate the analysis results in the context of those commitments. For example, prior 
to the development of performance commitments, it is not possible to construct a risk list that is 
keyed to the performance measures (except with respect to imposed constraints, which are firmly 
established prior to analysis). 
 
3.2.2.7 Assessing the Credibility of the Risk Analysis Results 
 
In a risk-informed decision environment, risk analysis is just one element of the decision-making 
process, and its influence on the decision is directly proportional to the regard in which it is held 
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by the deliberators. A well-done risk analysis whose merits are underappreciated might not 
influence a decision significantly, resulting in a lost opportunity to use the available information 
to best advantage. Conversely, an inferior risk analysis held in overly high regard has the ability 
to produce poor decisions by distorting the perceived capabilities of the analyzed alternatives. In 
order to address this potential, an evaluation of the credibility of the risk analysis is warranted 
prior to deliberating the actual results. 
 
NASA-STD-7009, Standard for Models and Simulations [31], provides the decision maker with 
an assessment of the modeling and simulation (M&S) results against key factors that: 
 
 Contribute to a decision-maker’s assessment of credibility and 
 
 Are sensibly assessed on a graduated credibility assessment scale (CAS). 
 
Table 3 (which reproduces NASA-STD-7009 Table 1) presents a high-level summary of the 
evaluation criteria. These are explained in greater detail in Section B.3 of the standard. Table 3 
by itself is not to be used in performing credibility assessments. Rather, the detailed level 
definitions in the standard are to be used. 
 
Table 3. Key Aspects of Credibility Assessment Levels 
(Factors with a Technical Review subfactor are underlined) 
 
 
To assist in the application of the evaluation criteria dictated in NASA-STD-7009, Figure 27 
presents a matrix indicating the “level” of analysis of each of the estimation methods. 
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Figure 27. Analysis Level Matrix  
 
 
3.2.2.8 The Technical Basis for Deliberation 
 
The TBfD (see Appendix D) specifies the minimum information needed to risk-inform the 
selection of a decision alternative. The content of the TBfD is driven by the question, "What 
information do the deliberators and decision-makers need in order for their decision process to be 
fully risk-informed?" 
 
Graphical tools are recommended, in addition to tabular data, as a means of communicating risk 
results. At this point in the process, the imposed constraints are the only reference points with 
respect to which shortfalls can be determined, so they are the only things “at risk” so far. Figure 
28 presents a notional color-coded chart of imposed constraint risk. In the figure, Alternative 7 is 
relatively low risk for every listed performance measure (i.e., those with imposed constraints on 
the allowable values), as well as for all constrained performance measures collectively (the 
“Total” column). Alternatives 12 and 3 have a mix of performance measure risks, some of which 
are high, resulting in a high risk of failing to meet one or more imposed constraints. 
 
To assist the deliberators and decision-maker in focusing on the most promising alternatives, 
with an awareness of the relative risks to imposed constraints, the imposed constraints risk 
matrix has been: 
 
 Sorted by total risk, with the least risky alternatives at the top; and 
 
 Colored on a relative basis from low risk (the blue-violet end of the spectrum) to high 
risk (the orange-red end of the spectrum). 
 
When presenting the performance measure pdfs themselves, “band-aid” charts can be used, 
which show the mean, 5th percentile, and 95th percentile values (and often the median as well). 
Figure 29 shows a notional example of a band-aid chart. Unlike the imposed constraints matrix, 
which includes only those performance measures that have imposed constraints, band-aid charts 
can be made for every performance measure in the risk analysis, thereby giving a complete 
picture of the analyzed performance of each alternative. 
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Figure 28. Notional Imposed Constraints Risk Matrix  
 
 
 
 
Figure 29. Notional Band Aid Chart for Performance Measure X  
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When using charts such as the band-aid chart of Figure 29, it is important to know the degree of 
correlation among the different alternatives. For example, in the figure, the pdfs of Alternative 1 
and Alternative 2 overlap to an extent that it may seem that the chances of either one having the 
higher performance are about the same. Indeed, this is true if the pdfs are independent. However, 
if they are correlated, then it might not be the case. For example, suppose the alternatives are 
identical except for some small design difference that slightly increases the value of Performance 
Measure X for Alternative 2. Then, although the performance of both alternatives is uncertain, 
the performance difference between them is known and constant. 
 
A direct representation of the difference between design alternatives, including the associated 
uncertainty, can supplement the information provided by band-aid charts, allowing for a better 
ability to make comparisons under uncertainty. A possible representation is shown in Figure 30 
[32]. The figure shows performance measure pdfs for two alternatives whose performance 
measure values are correlated. A third, dotted, curve shows the pdf of the performance difference 
between the two alternatives. This curve indicates that despite the significant overlap between 
the two performance measure pdfs, Alternative 2 is unequivocally superior to Alternative 1, at 
least for the performance measure shown. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30. Comparison of Uncertainty Distributions  
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Planetary Science Mission Example:  Conduct the Risk Analysis 
 
Each of the modeled performance measures is quantified, using a Monte Carlo shell to sample the 
uncertain performance parameter pdfs and propagate them through the analysis framework, producing 
the performance measure results shown below. Each chart presents the assessed performance of the 
alternatives for a single performance measure, as well as the applicable imposed constraint, which 
defines the level of performance needed in order to fully meet the top-level objectives. 
 
 
 
Performance Measure Results for the Planetary Science Mission Example 
 
There is substantial overlap among the pdfs, particularly for time to completion. In practice, 
consideration is given to performing additional analysis to resolve such overlap in cases where doing 
so is expected to illuminate the decision. However, additional analysis might not help to distinguish 
among alternatives, especially when the underlying uncertainties are common to them. This is 
considered to be the case for the notional analysis of the Planetary Science Mission Example. 
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3.3 Part 3 – Risk-Informed Alternative Selection 
 
The risk-informed alternative selection process within RIDM provides a method for integrating 
risk information into a deliberative process for decision making, relying on the judgment of the 
decision-makers to make a risk-informed decision. The decision-maker does not necessarily base 
his or her selection of a decision alternative solely on the results of the risk analysis. Rather, the 
risk analysis is just one input to the process, in recognition of the fact that it may not model 
everything of importance to the stakeholders. Deliberation employs critical thinking skills to the 
collective consideration of risk information, along with other issues of import to the stakeholders 
and the decision-maker, to support decision making. 
 
Figure 31 illustrates Part 3 of the RIDM process, Risk-Informed Alternative Selection. 
 
 
 
Figure 31. RIDM Process Part 3, Risk-Informed Alternative Selection  
 
In Step 5, performance commitments are developed, representing consistent levels of risk 
tolerance across alternatives. In Step 6, relevant stakeholders, risk analysts, and decision-makers 
deliberate the relative merits and drawbacks of each alternative, given the information in the 
TBfD. This step is iterative, and may involve additional risk analysis or other information 
gathering as the participants strive to fully assess the alternatives and identify those that they 
consider to be reasonable contenders, worthy of serious consideration by the decision-maker. 
The decision-maker, or his/her proxy, may also be involved at this stage to help cull the number 
of alternatives (a.k.a. downselecting). Once a set of contending alternatives has been identified, 
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the decision-maker integrates the issues raised during deliberation into a rationale for the 
selection of an alternative, and finalizes the performance commitments. The decision rationale is 
then documented in accordance with any existing project management directives, in a RISR. For 
pedagogical purposes, the process is laid out as if alternative selection involves a single decision 
that is made once deliberations are complete. However, as discussed in the Section 3.2.2.4 
guidance on sequential analysis and downselection, decisions are often made in stages and in a 
number of forums that may involve a variety of proxy decision-makers. 
 
Additionally, this handbook refers to the participants in deliberation as deliberators. This is also 
for pedagogical purposes. As illustrated in Figure 5, deliberators may be drawn from any of the 
sets of stakeholders, risk analysts, SMEs, and decision-makers. 
 
3.3.1 Step 5 – Develop Risk-Normalized Performance Commitments 
 
In order to generalize the consistent application of risk tolerance to the performance expectations 
of each decision alternative, this handbook introduces the concept of performance commitments. 
A performance commitment is a performance measure value set at a particular percentile of the 
performance measure’s pdf, so as to anchor the decision-maker’s perspective to that performance 
measure value as if it would be his/her commitment, were he/she to select that alternative. For a 
given performance measure, the performance commitment is set at the same percentile for all 
decision alternatives, so that the probability of failing to meet the different alternative 
commitment values is the same across alternatives.  
 
Performance commitments support a risk-normalized comparison of decision alternatives, in that 
a uniform level of risk tolerance is established prior to deliberating the merits and drawbacks of 
the various alternatives. Put another way, risk-normalized performance commitments show what 
each alternative is capable of with an equal likelihood of achieving that capability, given the state 
of knowledge at the time. 
 
The inputs to performance commitment development are: 
 
 The performance measure pdfs for each decision alternative; 
 
 An ordering of the performance measures; and 
 
 A risk tolerance for each performance measure, expressed as a percentile value. 
 
For each alternative, performance commitments are established by sequentially determining, 
based on the performance measure ordering, the value that corresponds to the stated risk 
tolerance, conditional on meeting previously-defined performance commitments. This value 
becomes the performance commitment for the current performance measure, and the process is 
repeated until all performance commitments have been established for all performance measures. 
Figure 32 illustrates the process. 
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Figure 32. Establishing Performance Commitments  
 
In Figure 32 there are only two performance measures, PM1 and PM2. If, for example, PM1 is 
P(LOC) and PM2 is cost, then, the risk analysis results can be shown as a scatter plot on the 
P(LOC)-cost plane (see Figure 32a), where each point represents the output from a single 
iteration of the Monte Carlo shell. If the ordering of the performance measures is P(LOC) first 
and cost second, P(LOC) would be the first performance measure to have a performance 
commitment established for it (see Figure 32b). This is done by determining the value of P(LOC) 
whose probability of exceedance equals the defined risk tolerance. That value becomes the 
P(LOC) performance commitment.7 The process is repeated for cost, conditional on the P(LOC) 
performance commitment being met. Thus, the points on the scatter plot that exceed the P(LOC) 
                                                 
7 If the “direction of goodness” of the performance measure were reversed, the performance commitment would be 
at the value whose probability of exceedance equals one minus the risk tolerance. 
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performance commitment have been removed from consideration and the cost performance 
commitment is established solely on the basis of the remaining data (see Figure 32c). The result 
is a set of performance commitments for the P(LOC) and cost performance measures that reflects 
the risk tolerances of the deliberators and decision-maker (see Figure 32d). This procedure can 
be extended to any number of performance measures. 
 
In general, different decision alternatives will have different performance commitments. But the 
probability of meeting each performance commitment will be the same (namely, one minus the 
risk tolerance of that performance measure), given that prior performance commitments in the 
performance measure ordering have been met: 
 
P(Performance Commitment i is met) = 1 - PMi Risk Tolerance 
= 1 - P(Performance Commitment i is unmet | Performance Commitments j < i are met) 
 
Moreover, the probability of meeting all performance commitments is identical for all 
alternatives, and is calculated as: 
 
 
 
 
3.3.1.1 Establishing Risk Tolerances on the Performance Measures 
 
The RIDM process calls for the specification of a risk tolerance for each performance measure, 
along with a performance measure ordering, as the basis for performance commitment 
development. These risk tolerance values have the following properties: 
 
 The risk tolerance for a given performance measure is the same across all alternatives, 
and 
 
 Risk tolerance may vary across performance measures, in accordance with the 
stakeholders’ and decision-maker’s attitudes towards risk for each performance measure. 
 
Risk tolerances, and their associated performance commitments, play multipurpose roles within 
the RIDM process: 
 
 Uniform risk tolerance across alternatives normalizes project/program risk, enabling 
deliberations to take place that focus on performance capabilities on a risk-normalized 
basis. 
 
 The risk tolerances that are established during the RIDM process indicate the levels of 
acceptable initial risk that the CRM process commits to managing during 
implementation. (Note: The actual initial risk is not established until performance 
requirements are agreed upon as part of the overall systems engineering process, and not 
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explicitly addressed until the CRM process is initialized. More information on CRM 
initialization can be found in Section 4.) 
 
 Performance commitments based on risk tolerance enable point value comparison of 
alternatives in a way that is appropriate to a situation that involves thresholds (e.g., 
imposed constraints). By comparing a performance commitment to a threshold, it is 
immediately clear whether or not the risk of crossing the threshold is within the 
established risk tolerance. In contrast, if a value such as the distribution mean were used 
to define performance commitments, the risk with respect to a given threshold would not 
be apparent. 
 
Issues to consider when establishing risk tolerances include: 
 
 Relationship to imposed constraints – In general, deliberators have a low tolerance for 
noncompliance with imposed constraints. Imposed constraints are akin to the success 
criteria for top-level objectives; if imposed constraints are not met, then objectives are not 
met and the endeavor fails. By establishing a correspondingly low risk tolerance on 
performance measures that have imposed constraints, stakeholders and decision-makers 
have assurance that if an alternative’s performance commitments exceed the associated 
imposed constraints, there is a high likelihood of program/project success. 
 
 High-priority objectives – It is expected that deliberators will also have a low risk 
tolerance for objectives that have high priority, but for which imposed constraints have 
not been set. The lack of an imposed constraint on a performance measure does not 
necessarily mean that the objective is of less importance; it may just mean that there is no 
well defined threshold that defines success. This could be the case when dealing with 
quantities of data, sample return mass capabilities, or operational lifetimes. It is generally 
the case for life safety, for which it is difficult to establish a constraint a priori, but which 
is nevertheless always among NASA’s top priorities. 
 
 Low-priority objectives and/or “stretch goals” – Some decision situations might involve 
objectives that are not crucial to program/project success, but which provide an 
opportunity to take risks in an effort to achieve high performance. Technology 
development is often in this category, at least when removed from a project’s critical 
path. In this case, a high risk tolerance could be appropriate, resulting in performance 
commitments that suggest the alternatives’ performance potentials rather than their 
established capabilities. 
 
 Rebaselining issues – Requirements on some performance measures might be seen as 
difficult to rebaseline. For these performance measures, deliberators might establish a 
low risk tolerance in order to reduce the possibility of having to rebaseline. 
 
Risk tolerance values are up to the deliberators and decision maker, and are subject to adjustment 
as deliberation proceeds, opinions mature, and sensitivity excursions are explored. In particular, 
it is recommended that sensitivity excursions be explored over a reasonable range of risk 
tolerances, not only for the purpose of making a decision that is robust with respect to different 
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risk tolerances, but also in order to find an appropriate balance between program/project risk and 
the performance that is specified by the performance commitments. 
 
3.3.1.2 Ordering the Performance Measures 
 
Because of possible correlations between performance measures, performance commitments are 
developed sequentially. As discussed in Section 3.3.1, performance commitments are defined at 
the value of a performance measure that corresponds to the defined risk tolerance, conditional on 
meeting previously defined performance commitments. In general, performance commitments 
depend on the order in which they are developed. 
 
Qualitatively, the effect that performance measure order has on performance commitment values 
is a follows: 
 
 If performance measures are independent, then the order is immaterial and the 
performance commitments will be set at the defined risk tolerances of the performance 
measures’ marginal pdfs. 
 
 If performance measures are positively correlated in terms of their directions of 
goodness, then the performance commitments that lag in the ordering will be set at higher 
levels of performance than would be suggested by their marginal pdfs alone. This is 
because lagging performance measures will have already been conditioned on good 
performance with respect to leading performance measures. This, in turn, will condition 
the lagging performance measures on good performance, too, due to the correlation. 
 
 If performance measures are negatively correlated in terms of their directions of 
goodness, then the performance commitments that lag in the ordering will be set at lower 
levels of performance than would be suggested by their marginal pdfs alone. Figure 32 
shows this phenomenon. In Figure 32c, the PM2 performance commitment is set at a 
slightly lower performance than it would have been if the data points that exceed the PM1 
performance commitment were not “conditioned out.” 
 
 The lower the risk tolerance, the lower the effect of conditioning on subsequent 
performance commitments. This is simply because the quantity of data that is 
“conditioned out” is directly proportional to risk tolerance. 
 
These general effects of performance measure ordering on performance commitments suggest 
the following ordering heuristics: 
 
 Order performance measures from low risk tolerance to high risk tolerance. This assures 
a minimum of difference between the risk tolerances as defined on the conditioned pdfs 
versus the risk tolerances as applied to the marginal pdfs. 
 
 Order performance measures in terms of the desire for specificity of the performance 
measure’s risk tolerances. For example, the performance commitment for the first 
performance measure in the ordering is precisely at its marginal pdf. As subsequent 
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performance commitments are set, dispersion can begin to accumulate as conditioning 
increases. 
 
Once the performance commitments are developed, each alternative can be compared to every 
other alternative in terms of their performance commitments, with the deliberators understanding 
that the risk of not achieving the levels of performance given by the performance commitments 
is the same across alternatives. Additionally, the performance commitments can be compared to 
any imposed constraints to determine whether or not the possibility that they will not be satisfied 
is within the risk tolerance of the deliberators, and ultimately, the decision maker. Figure 33 
notionally illustrates a set of performance commitments for each of three competing alternatives. 
Note that Alternative A does not satisfy the imposed constraint on payload capability within the 
risk tolerance that has been established for that performance measure. 
 
 
 
Figure 33. Performance Commitments and Risk Tolerances for Three Alternatives  
 
 
3.3.2 Step 6 – Deliberate, Select an Alternative, and Document the Decision Rationale 
 
The RIDM process invests the decision-maker with the authority and responsibility for critical 
decisions. While ultimate responsibility for alternative selection rests with the decision-maker, 
alternative evaluation can be performed within a number of deliberation forums which may be 
held before the final selection is made. As partial decisions or “down-selects” may be made at 
any one of these deliberation forums, they are routinely structured around a team organizational 
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structure identified by the decision-maker. It is important to have a team with broad based 
expertise to perform sufficient analysis to support a recommendation or decision. At the top of 
the structure may be the decision-maker or a deliberation lead appointed by the decision-maker. 
If a deliberation lead is appointed this individual should be an experienced manager, preferably 
one with an analytical background. 
 
3.3.2.1 Convening a Deliberation Forum 
 
Deliberation forums address the major aspects of the decision. The use of these forums helps 
ensure that a responsible person leads each important area of analysis. The focus of these forums 
will vary with the type of study.  
 
Depending on circumstances, forums can be split (e.g., into separate Safety and Technical), or 
functions can be combined (e.g., Cost and Schedule), or entirely new forums can be created (e.g., 
test, requirements or stakeholder). The final choice of forum structure belongs to the 
decision-maker. At a minimum, the forums should mirror the major aspects of the study. Thus 
the creation of forums offers an important early opportunity to contemplate the efforts processes 
and goals. Every forum must have enough members to achieve a “critical mass” of knowledge, 
interest and motivation. Typically, a small group with critical mass is more productive than a 
larger group with critical mass. This suggests starting with a small forum and adding members as 
necessary. 
 
Members of a deliberation forum should ideally be selected based on their qualifications. 
Consideration should be given to those with relevant experience, knowledge, and interest in the 
subject matter. These individuals are frequently referred to as SMEs. In some cases they have an 
organizational charter to support the process and in other cases they participate because they are 
heavily invested in the outcome of the deliberation. When the most qualified are not available, 
the next most qualified should be sought. 
 
People with diverse viewpoints on controversial issues should also be enlisted to participate in 
deliberations. They should represent the diversity of stakeholder interests. Partisans, by their 
nature, will defend their ideas and detect flaws in the ideas of their competition. This allows 
issues to be raised and resolved early that might otherwise lie in wait. A formal tracking system 
should be employed throughout the process to track items to closure. 
 
Additional information on deliberative processes can be found in [33]. 
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Planetary Science Mission Example:  Develop Risk-Normalized Performance Commitments 
 
Risk-normalized performance commitments were developed for each of the four analyzed alternatives, 
for the performance measures of time to completion, project cost, data volume, and planetary 
contamination. 
 
The table below shows the risk tolerance given to each. Because of the importance of meeting the 55 
month launch window, a low risk tolerance of 3% is given to time to completion. Then, given the 3% 
time to completion risk tolerance, a 27% risk tolerance was given to project cost based on the NASA 
policy of budgeting cost and schedule at a joint confidence level (JCL) of 70% [7]. The 10% data 
volume risk tolerance is reasonably low, but reflects the belief that minor shortfalls will not significantly 
erode the success of the mission. The planetary contamination risk tolerance is moderately low, 
reflecting the importance of avoiding radiological releases into the planetary environment. These risk 
tolerance values are discussed with the decision maker to ensure that they are consistent with his/her 
views. 
 
The table also shows the ordering of the performance measures that was used to develop 
performance commitments. Time to completion was chosen first due to its critical importance. Project 
cost was chosen next, due to its importance in an environment of scarce resources, and also because 
of its linkage to time to completion via the NASA JCL policy. Data volume was chosen third, due to its 
prominence among the technical objectives. 
 
Performance Measure Risk Tolerance for 
Planetary Science Mission Example 
 
 
 
The performance commitment chart (on the next page) shows the levels of performance that are 
achievable at the stated risk tolerances. One thing that is immediately evident is that Alternative 4 
does not meet the 6 month data volume imposed constraint. However, the deliberation team 
recognizes that a different risk tolerance might produce a data volume performance commitment that 
is in line with the imposed constraint, so they are reluctant to simply discard Alternative 4 out of hand. 
Instead, they determine the risk that would have to be accepted in order to produce a data volume 
performance commitment of at least 6 months. This turns out to be 12%, which the team considers to 
be within the range of reasonable tolerances (indeed, it is not significantly different from 10%). In the 
interest of illuminating the situation to the decision maker, the team includes both sets of results in the 
chart. 
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Planetary Science Mission Example:  Develop Risk-Normalized Performance Commitments 
(continued) 
 
Planetary Science Mission Example - Performance Commitment Chart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2.2 Identify Contending Alternatives 
 
After the performance commitments have been generated, they are used to pare down the set of 
decision alternatives to those that are considered to be legitimate contenders for selection by the 
decision-maker. This part of the process is a continuation of the pruning activity begun in 
Section 3.1.2. At this point, however, the deliberators have the benefit of the TBfD and the 
performance commitments, as well as the subjective, values-based input of the deliberators 
themselves. Rationales for elimination of non-contending alternatives include: 
 
 Infeasibility – Performance commitments are exceeded by the imposed constraints. In 
this case, imposed constraints cannot be met within the risk tolerance of the 
decision-maker. 
 
 Dominance – Other alternatives exist that have superior performance commitments on 
every performance measure, and substantially superior performance on some.8 In this 
case, an eliminated alternative may be feasible, but nonetheless is categorically inferior to 
one or more other alternatives. 
 
                                                 
8 When eliminating alternatives on the basis of dominance, it is prudent to allow some flexibility for uncertainty 
considerations beyond those captured by the performance commitments alone (discussed in the next subsection). 
Minor performance commitment shortfalls relative to other alternatives do not provide a strong rationale for 
elimination, absent a more detailed examination of performance uncertainty. 
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 Inferior Performance in Key Areas – In general, in any decision involving multiple 
objectives, some objectives will be of greater importance to deliberators than others. 
Typically important objectives include crew safety, mission success, payload capability, 
and data volume/quality. Alternatives that are markedly inferior in terms of their 
performance commitments in key areas can be eliminated on that basis, in recognition of 
stakeholder and decision-maker values. 
 
Section 3.2.2.4 discusses sequential analysis and downselection, in which non-contending 
alternatives are identified and eliminated in parallel with risk analysis, thereby reducing the 
analysis burden imposed by the decision-making process. Sequential analysis and downselection 
represents a graded approach to the identification of contending alternatives, and is another 
example of the iterative and collaborative nature of the RIDM process. 
 
3.3.2.3 Additional Uncertainty Considerations 
 
The guidance above for identifying contending alternatives is primarily focused on comparisons 
of performance commitments. This facilitates comparisons between alternatives (and against 
imposed constraints), and the elimination of non-contenders from further consideration. 
However, performance commitments do not capture all potentially relevant aspects of 
performance, since they indicate the performance at only a single percentile of each performance 
measure pdf. Therefore, alternatives identified as contenders on the basis of their performance 
commitments are further evaluated on the basis of additional uncertainty considerations relating 
to their performance at other percentiles of their performance measure pdfs. In particular, 
performance uncertainty may give rise to alternatives with the following characteristics: 
 
 They offer superior expected performance – In many decision contexts (specifically, 
those in which the decision-maker is risk neutral9), the decision-maker’s preference for 
an alternative with uncertain performance is equivalent to his or her preference for an 
alternative that performs at the mean value of the performance measure pdf. When this is 
the case, expected performance is valuable input to decision making, as it reduces the 
comparison of performance among alternatives to a comparison of point values. 
 
However, in the presence of performance thresholds, over-reliance on expected 
performance in decision making has the potential to: 
 
o Introduce potentially significant probabilities of falling short of imposed 
constraints, thereby putting objectives at risk, even when the mean value meets 
the imposed constraints 
 
o Contribute to the development of derived requirements that have a significant 
probability of not being achievable 
 
                                                 
9 A risk-neutral decision maker is indifferent towards a decision between an alternative with a definite performance 
of X, versus an alternative having an uncertain performance whose mean value is X. In other words, a risk-neutral 
decision maker is neither disproportionally attracted to the possibility of exceptionally high performance (risk 
seeking) nor disproportionally averse to the possibility of exceptionally poor performance (risk averse).  
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Since direction-setting, requirements-producing decisions at NASA typically involve 
performance thresholds, expected performance should be considered in conjunction with 
performance commitments, to assure that the decision is properly risk informed.  
 
 They offer the potential for exceptionally high performance – For a given 
performance measure pdf, the percentile value at the decision-maker’s risk tolerance may 
be unexceptional relative to other contending alternatives. However, at higher risk 
tolerances, its performance may exceed that of other alternatives, to the extent that it 
becomes attractive relative to them. This may be the case even in the presence of inferior 
performance commitments on the same, or different, performance measures. 
 
An example of this is shown notionally in Figure 34. In this figure, Alternative 2’s 
performance commitment is at a worse level of performance than Alternative 1’s; 
however, Alternative 2 offers a possibility of performance that is beyond the potential of 
Alternative 1. In this case, stakeholders and decision-makers have several choices. They 
can: 
 
o Choose Alternative 1 on the basis of superior performance at their risk tolerance; 
 
o Choose Alternative 2 on the basis that its performance at their risk tolerance, 
though not the best, is acceptable, and that it also has the potential for far superior 
performance; or 
 
o Set their risk tolerance such that the performance commitment for both 
alternatives is the same thus making this performance measure a 
non-discriminator between the two options. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34. An Example Uncertainty Consideration: The Potential for High Performance  
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In the second case, the decision-maker is accepting a higher program/project risk, which 
will lead to the development of more challenging requirements and increased CRM 
burden regardless of which alternative is selected. 
 
 They present a risk of exceptionally poor performance – This situation is the reverse 
of the situation above. In this case, even though the likelihood of not meeting the 
performance commitment is within the decision-makers’ risk tolerance, the consequences 
may be severe, rendering such an alternative potentially unattractive. 
 
Another uncertainty consideration, which is addressed below in the discussion of the iterative 
nature of deliberation, is whether or not a performance measure’s uncertainty can be effectively 
reduced, and whether or not the reduction would make a difference to the decision. This issue is 
mentioned here because wide pdfs can lead to poor performance commitments relative to other 
alternatives, and it would be unfortunate to discard an alternative on this basis if additional 
analysis could be done to reduce uncertainty. Note that if two attractive alternatives present 
themselves and time and resources are available, it may be advantageous to proceed with, at 
least, partial prototyping (that is, prototyping of some of the critical components) of both to 
provide the necessary data for reducing key performance measure uncertainties such that a robust 
decision can be made. 
 
3.3.2.4 Other Considerations 
 
Depending on the decision situation and proposed alternatives, a variety of other risk-based, as 
well as non-risk-based, considerations may also be relevant. These include: 
 
 Sensitivity of the performance commitments to variations in risk tolerance – 
Performance commitments are directly related to risk tolerance. Therefore, it is prudent 
for the deliberators to explore the effects of variations in the specified risk tolerances, to 
assure that the decision is robust to variations within a reasonable range of tolerances.  
 
 Risk disposition and handling considerations – The risks that exist relative to 
performance commitments are ultimately caused by undesirable scenarios that are 
identified and analyzed in the risk analysis. Because of the scope of risk analysis for 
RIDM (i.e., the necessity to analyze a broad range of alternatives), risk retirement 
strategies may not be fully developed in the analysis. Deliberators’ expertise is therefore 
brought to bear on the relative risk-retirement burdens that different alternatives present. 
For example, deliberators might feel more secure accepting a technology development 
risk that they feel they can influence, rather than a materials availability risk they are 
powerless to control. 
 
 Institutional considerations – Different alternatives may have different impacts on 
various NASA and non-NASA organizations and institutions. For example, one 
alternative might serve to maintain a particular in-house expertise, while another 
alternative might help maintain a regional economy. These broad-ranging issues are not 
necessarily captured in the performance measures, and yet they are of import to one or 
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more stakeholders. The deliberation forum is the appropriate venue for raising such 
issues for formal consideration as part of the RIDM process. 
 
3.3.2.5 Deliberation Is Iterative 
 
As illustrated in Figure 31, deliberation is an iterative process that focuses in on a set of 
contending alternatives for consideration by the decision-maker. Iteration during deliberation has 
both qualitative and quantitative aspects: 
 
 Qualitative – A deliberator may have a particular issue or concern that he or she wishes 
to reach closure on. This might require several rounds of deliberation as, for example, 
various subject matter experts are called in to provide expertise for resolution. 
 
 Quantitative – One or more performance measures might be uncertain enough to 
significantly overlap, thereby inhibiting the ability to make a robust decision. Moreover, 
large uncertainties will, in general, produce poor performance commitments, particularly 
when risk tolerance is low. Therefore, before a set of contending alternatives can be 
chosen, it is important that the deliberators are satisfied that particular uncertainties have 
been reduced to a level that is as low as reasonably achievable given the scope of the 
effort. It is expected that the risk analysis will be iterated, under the direction of the 
deliberators, to address their needs. 
 
3.3.2.6 Communicating the Contending Alternatives to the Decision Maker 
 
There comes a time in RIDM when the remaining alternatives all have positive attributes that 
make them attractive in some way and that make them all contenders. The next step is to find a 
way to clearly state for the decision-maker the advantages and disadvantages of each remaining 
alternative, especially how the alternatives address imposed constraints and satisfy stakeholder 
expectations. It is important that the process utilized by the deliberators affords him or her with 
ample opportunity to interact with the deliberators in order to fully understand the issues. This is 
particularly true if the decision-maker has delegated deliberation and downselection to a proxy. 
The information and interaction should present a clear, unbiased picture of the analysis results, 
findings, and recommendations. The more straightforward and clear the presentation, the easier it 
becomes to understand the differences among the alternatives. 
 
Some of the same communication tools used in the TBfD can be used here as well, applied to the 
contending alternatives forwarded for the decision-maker’s consideration. The imposed 
constraints risk matrix (Figure 28) summarizes what is among the most critical risk information. 
Additionally, information produced during deliberation should be summarized and forwarded to 
the decision-maker. This includes: 
 
 Risk tolerances and performance commitments – The deliberators establish risk 
tolerances on the performance measures, for the purpose of generating performance 
commitments that can serve as the primary basis for comparison of alternatives. These 
tolerances and the resulting performance commitments are key pieces of information for 
the decision-maker. They strongly influence requirements development and the 
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corresponding program/project risk that is to be accepted going forward. A notional 
performance commitment chart is shown in Figure 35. 
 
  
 
Figure 35. Notional Performance Commitment Chart  
 
 Pros and cons of each contending alternative – An itemized table of the pros and cons 
of each alternative is also recommended for the contending alternatives. This format has a 
long history of use, and is capable of expressing qualitative issues. It enables conflicting 
opinions to be documented and communicated to the decision-maker, so that he or she is 
aware of contentious issues and/or competing objectives among stakeholders. 
 
 Risk lists – Each alternative will have different contributors to its performance 
commitment risks. Correspondingly, each contending alternative will have a risk list 
written for it that identifies the major scenarios that contribute to risk. Each scenario has 
the potential to impact multiple performance measures over multiple mission execution 
domains. 
 
Figure 36 presents a notional example of a RIDM risk list. Each row of Figure 36 
represents a “risk,” as the term is used in the CRM process. Each risk is articulated in a 
risk statement, which identifies an existing condition (e.g., “A” for Risk #1) that indicates 
a possibility of some future consequence (“B” for Risk #1) that contributes to one or 
more performance commitments not being met. The magnitude of the contribution is 
indicated in stoplight format (red/yellow/green) on a performance commitment basis, as 
well as on a holistic basis. The basis for determining the magnitude depends on the form 
of the risk assessment and the criteria established in the risk management plan (RMP), if 
one exists. For example, analyses that use detailed logic modeling might express risk 
contributions in terms of importance measures such as the Fussell-Vesely or Risk 
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Reduction Worth (RRW) importance measures [24]. Less detailed analyses might use 
more qualitative criteria. Whatever method is used, consistency between the RIDM and 
CRM processes in this respect aids in the initialization of CRM for the selected 
alternative. 
 
 
 
Figure 36. Notional Risk List for Alternative X  
 
Regardless of how well the risk information is summarized or condensed into charts or matrices, 
the decision-maker should also always be presented with the raw risk results, namely the 
performance measure pdfs, upon request. Only by having these fundamental analysis results can 
the decision-maker bring his or her full judgment to bear on the selection of an alternative. 
Band-aid charts, as shown in Figure 29, are appropriate communication tools for communicating 
this information to the decision-maker. 
 
3.3.2.7 Alternative Selection Is Iterative 
 
Just as risk analysis and deliberation iterate until the deliberators are satisfied that their issues 
and concerns have been satisfactorily addressed, alternative selection also iterates until the 
decision-maker is satisfied that the information at his or her disposal is sufficient for making a 
risk-informed decision. This is especially true in situations where the decision-maker has 
delegated much of the activity to others, and is exposed to the issues mainly through summary 
briefings of analyses and deliberations conducted beforehand. Iteration might consist of 
additional focused analyses, additional subject matter expert input, consideration of alternate risk 
tolerances (and associated performance commitments) for some performance measures, etc. 
 
3.3.2.8 Selecting a Decision Alternative 
 
Once the decision-maker has been presented with enough information for risk-informed decision 
making, he or she is ready to select a decision alternative for implementation. The decision itself 
consists of two main ingredients: the selection of the decision alternative and finalization of the 
performance commitments. 
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 Selecting a decision alternative – The RIDM process is concerned with assuring that 
decisions are risk-informed, and does not specify a particular process for selecting the 
decision alternative itself. Decision-makers are empowered to use their own methods for 
decision making. These may be qualitative or quantitative; they may be structured or 
unstructured; and they may involve solitary reflection or the use of advisory panels. 
Regardless of the method used for making the decision, the decision-maker formulates 
and documents the decision rationale in light of the risk analysis. 
 
 Finalizing the performance commitments – In the requirements-based environment of 
the NASA program/project life cycle, decisions are essentially defined by the 
requirements they produce. Performance commitments capture the performance 
characteristics that the decision-maker expects from the implemented alternative, and 
also establish the initial risk that the decision-maker is accepting and calling on the CRM 
process to manage. 
 
As discussed in Section 3.3.1, performance commitments are produced by the 
deliberators as a result of establishing risk tolerances on the performance measures. This 
facilitates deliberation of alternatives in terms of point value estimates of performance 
that reflect the deliberators’ risk attitudes. The decision-maker may choose to keep the 
risk tolerances and performance commitments established by the deliberators, or he/she 
may choose to modify them in accordance with his/her own risk tolerances. In situations 
where the decision-maker’s risk tolerances differ significantly from those established by 
the deliberators, the decision-maker may ask for additional deliberation in light of the 
modified commitments. In turn, the deliberators may ask the risk analysts for a revised 
risk list that reflects the new situation. 
 
3.3.2.9 Documenting the Decision Rationale 
 
The final step in the RIDM process is for the decision-maker to document the rationale for the 
selected alternative in the RISR. In a NASA program/project context, the RISR is developed in 
accordance with the activity’s risk management plan. Information on documenting the decision 
rationale can be found in Appendix E, Content Guide for the Risk-Informed Selection Report.  
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Planetary Science Mission Example: 
Deliberate, Select an Alternative, and Document the Decision Rationale 
 
Deliberation and selection of an alternative is done in light of the TBfD which, in addition to the results 
presented in the previous Planetary Science Mission Example boxes, also contains the imposed 
constraint risk matrix. 
 
Planetary Science Mission Imposed Constraint Risk Matrix 
 
 
 
*This is the probability of failing to meet one or more of the imposed constraints. Because the performance 
measures are correlated, the total probability is not necessarily the sum of the individual imposed constraint risk 
probabilities. For example, if time to completion is greater than 55 months, then data volume is zero. 
 
The first objective of the deliberators is to see whether or not the set of alternatives can be pruned 
down to a smaller set of contending alternatives to present to the decision maker. The imposed 
constraint risk matrix shows that the risk of not meeting the $500M cost constraint is high for 
Alternatives 2 and 4 compared to the agreed-upon risk tolerance of 27%. Specifically, Alternatives 2 
and 4 are infeasible given the combination of the cost constraint and the JCL policy, which specifies 
that the project be budgeted at the 70th percentile or greater. The 70th percentile cost estimates are 
$860M for Alternative 2 and $650M for Alternative 4. Thus, the deliberators prune these alternatives 
from contention. 
 
Alternatives 1 and 3 are identified as the contending alternatives that are recommended to the 
decision maker for consideration. 
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Planetary Science Mission Example: 
Deliberate, Select an Alternative, and Document the Decision Rationale (continued) 
 
In choosing between Alternatives 1 and 3, the decision maker must weigh differing performance 
capabilities with respect to competing objectives. Alternative 1, which uses propulsive insertion, has the 
following pros and cons: 
 
Alternative 1: Propulsive Insertion, Low-Fidelity Science Package 
 
Pros: 
 
 ● A relatively low risk of not meeting the 6 month data volume imposed constraint 
 
 ● The ability to commit to a higher data volume, given the decision-maker’s risk tolerance 
 
 ● A low probability of planetary contamination that is well within the decision-maker’s risk tolerance 
 
Cons: 
 
 ● Higher cost, due to the need for a medium size launch vehicle 
 
Conversely, Alternative 3 has the following pros and cons: 
 
Alternative 3: Aerocapture, Low-Fidelity Science Package 
 
Pros: 
 
 ● Use of aerocapture technology, which the decision-maker considers to be a technology that 
promises future returns in terms of reduced payload masses for missions that can exploit 
aerocapture and/or aerobraking opportunities 
 
 ● Lower cost, due to the use of a small launch vehicle afforded by the lower payload mass 
 
Cons: 
 
 ● Higher risk of not meeting the 6 month data volume imposed constraint, due to the potential for 
aerocapture failure during insertion 
 
 ● Lower data volume at the decision-maker’s risk tolerance 
 
 ● A higher probability of planetary contamination, though still within the decision-maker’s risk 
tolerance 
 
The decision maker sees the choice in terms of whether or not the Planetary Science Mission is 
appropriate to use as an aerocapture test bed. If Alternative 3 is chosen and the mission succeeds, 
then not only will it advance the technology of aerocapture, but it will save money for this and future 
missions. If it fails, then the only near-term opportunity to gather important data on Planet “X” will be 
lost. It is a difficult decision, particularly because Alternative 3’s data volume imposed constraint is near 
the edge of the decision-maker’s risk tolerance. The decision-maker confers with selected deliberators 
and stakeholders, chooses the alternative that he believes best balances the pros and cons of each 
contending alternative, and documents his/her decision rationale in the RISR. 
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4. SETTING THE STAGE FOR CRM10  
 
As discussed earlier and illustrated in Figure 2, risk management is the combination of RIDM 
and CRM. The purpose of this handbook has been to provide guidance on implementing the 
RIDM requirements of NPR 8000.4A. Having done that in the first three sections, it is now time 
to set the stage for implementing the CRM requirements of the NPR. CRM should pick up where 
RIDM left off, informed by all that has been produced by the execution of the RIDM process at 
program/project onset. 
 
4.1 RIDM “Initializes” CRM 
 
As stated in Section 2.2, RIDM “initializes” CRM. What does it mean for RIDM to initialize 
CRM? The answer is that the RIDM process provides the CRM process with: 
 
 A risk analysis for the selected alternative and other alternatives that were considered 
during the RIDM deliberation 
 
 An initial set of identified and analyzed risks in the form of an initial risk list and 
associated analytical information 
 
Note that in addition to the above, Systems Engineering must provide CRM with a set of risk 
management objectives in the form of a schedule of acceptable risk levels. 
 
In accordance with NPR 8000.4A, CRM will manage implementation risks while “focused on 
the baseline performance requirements emerging from the RIDM process.” After being 
“initialized,” the job of CRM will be to complete the RIDM risk analysis (as described in Section 
4.2.1) and to “burn-down” the risk of not achieving the performance requirements, to acceptable 
levels by the appropriate milestones. The starting point for the CRM process, or the initial risk 
levels for each of the performance measures, will be determined from the combination of 1) the 
performance requirements established by Systems Engineering and 2) the pdfs for each 
performance measure that come from the RIDM risk analysis (after it is completed within CRM). 
Note: While the decision-maker’s risk tolerance level for each performance measure established 
the values of the performance commitments, the performance commitments do not necessarily 
constitute the starting values of risk for the CRM process. 
 
The initial risk levels for each performance measure establish initial risk acceptance levels11 for 
the achievement of performance requirements, with the expectation of improvement at key 
program/project milestones, and the objective of meeting the requirements per an associated 
verification standard12. In other words, as the program/project evolves over time, mitigations are 
implemented, and as risk concerns are retired and the state of knowledge about the performance 
measures improves, uncertainty should decrease; with an attendant lowering of residual risk (see 
Figure 37). The decrease may not be linear, as new risks may emerge during the project requiring 
                                                 
10 This section is intended only to provide high-level concepts; details will follow in the forthcoming Risk 
Management Handbook. 
11 Risk acceptance levels are levels of risk considered to be acceptable by a decision maker at a given point in time. 
12 Verification standards are the standards used to verify that the performance requirements have been met. 
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new mitigations to be instituted. Overall, however, the tendency should be toward lower risk as 
time progresses. 
 
 
 
Figure 37. Decreasing Uncertainty and Risk over Time  
 
4.2 Outputs of RIDM that Input to CRM 
 
The following outputs of the RIDM process constitute inputs to the CRM process: 
 
 A scenario-based risk analysis (Section 3.2) of the selected alternative and other 
alternatives developed down to the level of quantifiable causes for discriminator 
performance measures and to some lesser level of detail for the non-discriminator 
performance measures. The risk analysis will include: 
 
o A list of the identified risk-driving uncertainties 
 
o A working risk model(s) that include(s): 
 
 Risk scenarios 
 
 First-order mitigations 
 
 Performance parameter distributions 
 
 Performance measure distributions with imposed constraints, risk 
tolerance level, and performance commitments 
 
 The Risk-Informed Selection Report, including the selected alternative and the initial 
performance commitment-based risk list (Figure 36) consisting of risks that impact 
discriminator, as well as non-discriminator performance measures, together with their 
associated risk statements and descriptive narratives. 
 
Perf.
Req.
Perf.
Req.
Perf.
Req.
Program/Project 
Start
Intermediate 
Milestone
Mission Time
Risk Risk
Risk
Direction of 
Goodness
Performance 
Measure X
Performance 
Measure X
Performance 
Measure X
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4.2.1 Completing the RIDM Risk Analysis 
 
The Risk Analysis developed as part of the RIDM process will have addressed all of the 
performance measures for the selected alternative, but only those performance measures 
considered discriminators among the alternatives will have been analyzed in detail. Because the 
initial risk list is based on the RIDM risk analysis, it is likely to contain only the major, top-level, 
initially evident risks and may therefore be incomplete, especially with respect to the non-
discriminator performance measures. 
 
As soon as feasible, the CRM process will need to complete the RIDM risk analysis for the non-
discriminator performance measures and expand and update the initial risk list to include any 
new risks from the completed risk analysis. After the establishment of performance requirements 
by Systems Engineering, the risk analysis will have to be updated to reflect the performance 
requirements and resulting risks relative to them. Over the remaining life of the program/project, 
the risk list will also have to be updated with 1) the addition of new risks that become 
identifiable as the project progresses and 2) any changes that may be needed as risks evolve over 
time. 
 
4.3 Output from Systems Engineering that Inputs to CRM 
 
The output from Systems Engineering that constitutes input to the CRM process consists of the 
performance requirements for the selected alternative. The performance requirements developed 
by Systems Engineering are risk-informed, based on RIDM’s performance measure pdfs, 
imposed constraints, risk tolerance levels and associated performance commitments, the risk 
analysis of the selected alternative, and any other information deemed pertinent by the Systems 
Engineering decision-maker. 
 
Because the performance requirements are risk-informed but developed outside of the RIDM 
process, it is possible that their values may differ significantly from the performance 
commitments. In some cases the performance requirements may result in significantly higher 
risk levels compared to the performance commitments. Note: In such cases it may be prudent for 
program/project management to negotiate new performance requirements with System 
Engineering. 
 
Since for the above reasons, the performance requirement values may differ from the 
corresponding performance commitment values of the selected alternative, the RIDM analysis 
process needs to check how any such difference translates into initial program risk acceptance 
levels. This is done by comparing the performance requirement values with the performance 
measure pdfs that were initially used to establish the performance commitments. The initial risk 
acceptance levels corresponding to the established performance requirements are transmitted to 
CRM, together with a schedule for their “burn-down.” 
 
4.4 Performing CRM 
 
The purpose of CRM is to track whether the risk of not satisfying the performance requirements 
is being burned down in accordance with the progressively reduced limits on the risk, and to 
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introduce mitigations when needed to satisfy the burn-down schedule. The burn-down schedule 
is to be referenced to and satisfied at certain program-selected milestones (e.g., SRR, SDR, PDR, 
CDR, etc.). 
 
It is permissible in some cases for CRM to track performance margins as a surrogate for tracking 
risks. This is typically the case when the risk of not meeting a performance requirement is 
sufficiently low that it is not necessary to perform a detailed analysis of the uncertainties to 
verify that the burn-down profile is being satisfied. 
 
4.5 The Continuing “Two-Way Street” Between RIDM and CRM 
 
The flow of information between the RIDM and CRM processes begins in earnest, but should 
not end after alternative selection. Initially, RIDM (and Systems Engineering) will provide to 
CRM: 
 
 Risks 
 
 Risk Analysis 
 
 Mitigations 
 
 (From Systems Engineering) Initial performance requirement risk acceptance levels and 
“burn-down” schedule 
 
Later, CRM may feedback to RIDM: 
 
 Completed, updated risk analysis that includes new risks 
 
 New risks for which mitigations are not available, as they arise 
 
 New and revised risk mitigations, as they are developed 
 
 Risks that demonstrate they cannot be controlled, as they arise 
 
 New performance measures arising due to the addition of new performance requirements 
 
 Verification that performance requirement risk burn-down objectives are being met at 
program-selected milestones 
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APPENDIX A: NPR 8000.4A REQUIREMENTS CROSS-REFERENCE 
 
Table A-1 provides a cross reference between RIDM-related requirements and good practices in 
NPR 8000.4A, and the RIDM Handbook sections that address them. 
 
Table A-1. Cross-Reference Between RIDM-Related NPR 8000.4A “Good Practices” and 
Requirements, and RIDM Handbook Guidance13 
 
NPR 8000.4A “Good Practices” and Requirements 
“Good Practices” relating to RIDM  RIDM Handbook Guidance 
1.2.2.a. RIDM within each organizational unit involves:  
1.2.2.a. (1) Identification of decision alternatives, 
recognizing opportunities where they arise, and 
considering a sufficient number and diversity of 
performance measures to constitute a 
comprehensive set for decision-making purposes.  
Section 3.1, Part 1 – Identification of Alternatives 
1.2.2.a. (2) Risk analysis of decision alternatives 
to support ranking. 
Section 3.2, Part 2 – Risk Analysis of Alternatives 
1.2.2.a. (3) Selection of a decision alternative 
informed by (not solely based on) risk analysis 
results. 
Section 3.3, Part 3 – Risk-Informed Alternative 
Selection 
1.2.2.c. As part of a risk-informed process, the complete 
set of performance measure values (and corresponding 
assessed risks) is used, along with other considerations, 
within a deliberative process to improve the basis for 
decision making.  
a) Performance measure values: Section 3.1.1.2,  
Derive Performance Measures 
 
b) Deliberative process: Section 3.3.2, Step 6 – 
Deliberate, Select an Alternative, and Document 
the Decision Rationale 
1.2.2.d. Once a decision alternative has been selected for 
implementation, the performance measure values that 
informed its selection define the baseline performance 
requirements for CRM.  
a) Section 2, RIDM Process Interfaces 
 
b) Section 4, Setting the Stage for CRM 
1.2.2.e. ...for some purposes, decision making needs to be 
supported by quantification of the “aggregate risk” 
associated with a given performance measure; i.e., 
aggregation of all contributions to the risk associated with 
that performance measure.  
Section 3.2.2, Step 4 – Conduct the Risk Analysis 
and Document the Results 
1.2.2.e. ...the feasibility of quantifying aggregate risk is 
determined for each performance measure and then 
documented in the Risk Management Plan for each 
organizational unit.  
Section 3.2.1, Step 3 – Set the Framework and 
Choose the Analysis Methodologies 
1.2.4.a. RIDM and CRM [are] complementary processes 
that operate within every organizational unit.  
Section 2.2, Coordination of RIDM and CRM 
1.2.4.a. Each unit applies the RIDM process to decide how 
to fulfill its performance requirements and applies the 
CRM process to manage risks associated with 
implementation.  
 
 
Section 2.2, Coordination of RIDM and CRM 
                                                 
13 The “Good Practices” listed in Table A-1 are found in the indicated paragraphs of NPR 8000.4A. While they are 
not actual requirements, mandatory or advisory, they are the preferred ways to implement applicable parts of the 
NASA risk management process described in NPR 8000.4A. 
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NPR 8000.4A “Good Practices” and Requirements 
“Good Practices” relating to RIDM  RIDM Handbook Guidance 
1.2.4.e. A basis for the evaluation of the performance 
measures and their associated risks should be agreed upon 
and documented in advance (or indicated by reference) in 
the Risk Management Plan. 
a) Section 3.1.1.2, Derive Performance Measures 
 
b) Section 3.2.1, Step 3 – Set the Framework and 
Choose the Analysis Methodologies 
 
1.2.4.f. It is the responsibility of the organizational unit at 
the higher level to assure that the performance 
requirements assigned to the organizational unit at the 
lower level reflect appropriate tradeoffs between/among 
competing objectives and risks.  
a) Section 2.1, Negotiating Objectives across 
Organizational Unit Boundaries 
 
b) Section 3.3.2, Step – 6, Deliberate, Select an 
Alternative, and Document the Decision Rationale 
1.2.4.f. The performance requirements can be changed, if 
necessary, but redefining and rebaselining them need to be 
negotiated with higher levels, documented, and subject to 
configuration control.  
Section 2.2, Coordination of RIDM and CRM 
1.2.4.g. Both CRM and RIDM are applied within a graded 
approach. The resources and depth of analysis need to be 
commensurate with the stakes and the complexity of the 
decision situations being addressed. 
a) Section 3.2.1, Step 3 – Set the Framework and 
Choose the Analysis Methodologies 
 
b) Section 3.2.2, Step 4 – Conduct the Risk 
Analysis and Document the Results 
3.3.2.2.a. Note: The requirement to consider uncertainty is 
to be implemented in a graded fashion. If uncertainty can 
be shown to be small based on a simplified (e.g., 
bounding) analysis, and point estimates of performance 
measures clearly imply a decision that new information 
would not change, then detailed uncertainty analysis is 
unnecessary. Otherwise, some uncertainty analysis is 
needed to determine whether the expected benefit of the 
decision is affected significantly by uncertainty. In some 
cases, it may be beneficial to obtain new evidence to 
reduce uncertainty, depending on the stakes associated 
with the decision, the resources needed to reduce 
uncertainty, and programmatic constraints on uncertainty 
reduction activities (such as schedule constraints).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 3.2.2, Step 4 – Conduct the Risk Analysis 
and Document the Results 
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NPR 8000.4A “Good Practices” and Requirements 
Requirements relating to RIDM RIDM Handbook Guidance 
3.1.1. The manager of each organizational unit shall:  
3.1.1.a. Ensure that the RIDM and CRM 
processes are implemented within the unit.  
Section 2, RIDM Process Interfaces 
3.1.1.d. Ensure that key decisions of the 
organizational unit are risk-informed.  
 
Note: Examples of key decisions include: Architecture and 
design decisions, make-buy decisions, source selection in 
major procurements, budget reallocation (allocation of 
reserves). 
Section 1.4, When is RIDM Invoked? 
3.1.1.e. Ensure that risks are identified and 
analyzed in relation to the performance 
requirements for each acquisition of the 
organizational unit and risk analysis results are 
used to inform the source selection. 
a) Section 1.4, When is RIDM Invoked? 
 
b) Section 3.2.2, Step 4 – Conduct the Risk 
Analysis and Document the Results 
3.1.1.i. Ensure that dissenting opinions arising 
during risk management decision making are 
handled through the dissenting opinion process as 
defined in NPR 7120.5D. 
Section 3.2.2, Step 4 – Conduct the Risk Analysis 
and Document the Results 
3.1.2 The risk manager of each organizational unit shall:  
3.1.2.a. Facilitate the implementation of RIDM 
and CRM. 
RIDM Handbook 
3.1.2.c.(2) Ensure the development of a Risk 
Management Plan that explicitly addresses safety, 
technical, cost, and schedule risks. 
Section 3.1.1.2, Derive Performance Measures 
3.1.2.c.(3) Ensure the development of a Risk 
Management Plan that delineates the 
organizational unit’s approach for applying 
RIDM and CRM within a graded approach. 
 
Note: A “graded approach” applies risk management 
processes at a level of detail and rigor that adds value without 
unnecessary expenditure of unit resources.  
Section 3.2.1, Step 3 – Set the Framework and 
Choose the Analysis Methodologies 
3.1.2.c.(4) Ensure the development of a Risk 
Management Plan that for each performance 
requirement, documents, or indicates by 
reference, whether its associated risks (including 
the aggregate risk) are to be assessed 
quantitatively or qualitatively and provides a 
rationale for cases where it is only feasible to 
assess the risk qualitatively. 
a) Section 3.2.1, Step 3 – Set the Framework and 
Choose the Analysis Methodologies 
 
b) Section 3.2.2, Step 4 – Conduct the Risk 
Analysis and Document the Results 
3.1.2.c.(6) Ensure the development of a Risk 
Management Plan that identifies stakeholders, 
such as Risk Review Boards, to participate in 
deliberations regarding the disposition of risks. 
Section 3.3.1, Step 6 – Deliberate, Select an 
Alternative, and Document the Decision Rationale 
3.1.2.c.(9) Ensure the development of a Risk 
Management Plan that delineates the processes 
for coordination of risk management activities 
and sharing of risk information with other 
affected organizational units.  
Section 2, RIDM Process Interfaces 
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NPR 8000.4A “Good Practices” and Requirements 
Requirements relating to RIDM RIDM Handbook Guidance 
3.2 The manager of each organizational unit shall:  
3.2.a. The manager of each organizational unit 
shall ensure that performance measures defined 
for the organizational unit are used for risk 
analysis of decision alternatives to assist in 
RIDM. 
a) Section 3.1.1.2, Derive Performance Measures 
 
b) Section 3.2.1, Step 3 – Set the Framework and 
Choose the Analysis Methodologies 
3.2.b. The manager of each organizational unit 
shall ensure that the bases for performance 
requirement baselines (or rebaselines) are 
captured. 
a) Section 3.3.1, Step 5 – Develop 
Risk-Normalized Performance Commitments 
 
b) Section 3.3.2, Step 6 – Deliberate, Select an 
Alternative, and Document the Decision Rationale 
3.2.c. The manager of each organizational unit 
shall negotiate institutional support performance 
requirements with Center support units when 
required to meet program/project requirements. 
Section 2.1, Negotiating Objectives across 
Organizational Unit Boundaries 
3.2.d. The manager of each organizational unit 
shall ensure that performance measures defined 
for the organizational unit are used to scope the 
unit’s CRM process (Requirement). 
a) Section 2.2, Coordination of RIDM and CRM 
 
b) Section 4, Setting the Stage for CRM 
 
3.3.2.1.b. The risk manager shall ensure that risk analyses 
performed to support RIDM are used as input to the 
“Identify” activity of CRM.  
a) Section 2.2, Coordination of RIDM and CRM 
 
b) Section 4, Setting the Stage for CRM 
3.3.2.2.a. The risk manager shall determine the protocols 
for estimation of the likelihood and magnitude of the 
consequence components of risks, including the 
timeframe, uncertainty characterization, and quantification 
when appropriate, and document these protocols in the 
Risk Management Plan. 
a) Section 3.2.1, Step 3 – Set the Framework and 
Choose the Analysis Methodologies  
 
b) Section 3.2.2, Step 4 – Conduct the Risk 
Analysis and Document the Results 
3.3.2.2.c. Wherever determined to be feasible (as 
documented in the Risk Management Plan), the risk 
manager shall ensure the characterization of aggregate risk 
through analysis (including uncertainty evaluation), as an 
input to the decision-making process. 
a) Section 3.2.1, Step 3 – Set the Framework and 
Choose the Analysis Methodologies  
 
b) Section 3.2.2, Step 4 – Conduct the Risk 
Analysis and Document the Results 
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APPENDIX B: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AHP Analytic Hierarchy Process 
AoA Analysis of Alternatives 
ASAP Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 
  
CAS Credibility Assessment Scale 
CCDF Complimentary Cumulative Distribution Function 
CD Center Director 
CDR Critical Design Review 
CEV Crew Exploration Vehicle 
CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics 
Ci Curie 
CLV Crew Launch Vehicle 
ConOps Concept of Operations 
COS Cosmic Origins Spectrograph 
CRAFT Comparative Risk Assessment Framework and Tools 
CRM Continuous Risk Management 
  
DDT&E Design, Development, Test & Evaluation 
DM De-orbit Module 
DoD Department of Defense 
DRM Design Reference Mission 
  
EDS Earth Departure Stage 
EELV Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle 
EOL End of Life 
EOM End of Mission 
ESAS Exploration Systems Architecture Study 
ETO Earth-to-Orbit 
  
FGS Fine Guidance Sensor 
FOM Figure of Merit 
  
G&A General and Administrative 
  
HQ Headquarters 
HST Hubble Space Telescope 
  
ISS International Space Station 
  
JCL Joint Confidence Level 
  
KSC Kennedy Space Center 
  
LCF Latent Cancer Fatality 
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LEO Low Earth Orbit 
LLO Low Lunar Orbit 
LOC Loss of Crew 
LOI Lunar Orbit Insertion 
LOM Loss of Mission 
LSAM Lunar Surface Access Module 
  
M&S Modeling & Simulation 
MAUT Multi-Attribute Utility Theory 
MOE Measure of Effectiveness 
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center 
MSO Mission Support Office 
  
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NPD NASA Policy Directive 
NPR NASA Procedural Requirements 
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
NRC National Research Council 
  
ODC Other Direct Cost 
  
PC Performance Commitment 
pdf Probability Density Function 
PDR Preliminary Design Review 
PM Performance Measure 
pmf Probability Mass Function 
PnSL Probability of No Second Launch 
PR Performance Requirement 
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
  
RIDM Risk-Informed Decision Making 
RISR Risk-Informed Selection Report 
RM Risk Management 
RMP Risk Management Plan 
ROM Rough Order-of-Magnitude 
RRW Risk Reduction Worth 
RSRB Redesigned Solid Rocket Booster 
RTG Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator 
  
S&MA Safety & Mission Assurance 
SDM Service and De-orbit Module 
SDR System Design Review 
SEI Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University 
SM Service Module 
SME Subject Matter Expert 
SMn Servicing Mission n 
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SRR System Requirements Review 
SSME Space Shuttle Main Engine 
STS Space Transportation System 
  
TBfD Technical Basis for Deliberation 
TLI Trans-Lunar Injection 
TRL Technology Readiness Level 
  
WBS Work Breakdown Structure 
WFC3 Wide Field Camera 3 
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APPENDIX C: DEFINITIONS 
 
Aleatory: Pertaining to stochastic (non-deterministic) events, the outcome of which is 
described by a pdf. From the Latin alea (game of chance, die). [Adapted from [27]] 
 
Consequence: The possible negative outcomes of the current conditions that are creating 
uncertainty. [Adapted from [34]] 
 
Continuous Risk Management (CRM): A specific process for the management of risks 
associated with implementation of designs, plans, and processes. The CRM functions of 
identify, analyze, plan, track, control, and communicate and document provide a disciplined 
environment for continuously assessing what could go wrong, determining which issues are 
important to deal with, and implementing strategies for dealing with them. [Adapted from 
[34]] 
 
Deliberation: Any process for communication and for raising and collectively considering 
issues. In deliberation, people discuss, ponder, exchange observations and views, reflect upon 
information and judgments concerning matters of mutual interest, and attempt to persuade each 
other. Deliberations about risk often include discussions of the role, subjects, methods, and 
results of analysis. [Excerpted from [33]] 
 
Dominated Alternative: An alternative that is inferior to some other alternative with respect to 
every performance measure. 
 
Epistemic: Pertaining to the degree of knowledge. From the Greek episteme (knowledge). 
[Adapted from [27]] 
 
Imposed Constraint: A limit on the allowable values of the performance measure with which it 
is associated. Imposed constraints reflect performance requirements that are negotiated 
between NASA organizational units and which define the task to be performed. 
 
Likelihood: Probability of occurrence. 
 
Objective: A specific thing that you want to achieve. [12] 
 
Performance Commitment: A level of performance that a decision alternative is intended to 
achieve at a given level of risk. Performance commitments are established on the performance 
measures of each alternative as a means of comparing performance across alternatives that is 
consistent with the alternative-independent risk tolerance of the decision-maker. 
 
Version 1.0 - NASA/SP-2010-576 – APRIL 2010 
 
106 of 128 
Performance Measure: A metric used to measure the extent to which a system, process, or 
activity fulfills its associated performance objective. [Adapted from [1]] 
 
Performance Objective: An objective whose fulfillment is directly quantified by an associated 
performance measure. In the RIDM process, performance objectives are derived via an 
objectives hierarchy, and represent the objectives at the levels of the hierarchy. 
 
Performance Parameter: Any value needed to execute the models that quantify the 
performance measures. Unlike performance measures, which are the same for all alternatives, 
performance parameters typically vary among alternatives, i.e., a performance parameter that 
is defined for one alternative might not apply to another alternative.  
 
Performance Requirement: The value of a performance measure to be achieved by an 
organizational unit’s work that has been agreed-upon to satisfy the needs of the next higher 
organizational level. [1] 
 
Quantifiable: An objective is quantifiable if the degree to which it is satisfied can be 
represented numerically. Quantification may be the result of direct measurement; it may be the 
product of standardized analysis; or it may be assigned subjectively. 
 
Risk: In the context of RIDM, risk is the potential for shortfalls, which may be realized in the 
future, with respect to achieving explicitly-stated performance commitments. The performance 
shortfalls may be related to institutional support for mission execution, or related to any one or 
more of the following mission execution domains: safety, technical, cost, schedule. 
 
Risk is operationally defined as a set of triplets:  
 a. The scenario(s) leading to degraded performance in one or more performance 
 measures,  
 b. The likelihood(s) of those scenarios, 
 c. The consequence(s), impact, or severity of the impact on performance that would 
 result if those scenarios were to occur. 
 
Uncertainties are included in the evaluation of likelihoods and consequences. [Adapted from 
[1]] 
 
Risk Analysis: For the purpose of this Handbook, risk analysis is defined as the probabilistic 
assessment of performance such that the probability of not meeting a particular performance 
commitment can be quantified. 
 
Risk Averse: The risk attitude of preferring a definite outcome to an uncertain one having the 
same expected value. 
 
Version 1.0 - NASA/SP-2010-576 – APRIL 2010 
 
107 of 128 
Risk-Informed Decision Making: A risk-informed decision-making process uses a diverse set 
of performance measures (some of which are model-based risk metrics) along with other 
considerations within a deliberative process to inform decision making. 
 
 Note: A decision-making process relying primarily on a narrow set of model-based risk 
 metrics would be considered “risk-based.” [1] 
 
Risk Management: Risk management includes RIDM and CRM in an integrated framework. 
This is done in order to foster proactive risk management, to better inform decision making 
through better use of risk information, and then to more effectively manage implementation 
risks by focusing the CRM process on the baseline performance requirements emerging from 
the RIDM process. [1] 
 
Risk Seeking: The risk attitude of preferring an uncertain outcome to a certain one having the 
same expected value. 
 
Robust: A robust decision is one that is based on sufficient technical evidence and 
characterization of uncertainties to determine that the selected alternative best reflects 
decision-maker preferences and values given the state of knowledge at the time of the decision, 
and is considered insensitive to credible modeling perturbations and realistically foreseeable 
new information.  
 
Scenario: A sequence of credible events that specifies the evolution of a system or process 
from a given state to a future state. In the context of risk management, scenarios are used to 
identify the ways in which a system or process in its current state can evolve to an undesirable 
state. 
 
Sensitivity Study: The study of how the variation in the output of a model can be apportioned 
to different sources of variation in the model input and parameters. [31] 
 
Stakeholder: A stakeholder is an individual or organization that is materially affected by the 
outcome of a decision or deliverable but is outside the organization doing the work or making 
the decision. [35] 
 
Performance Parameter: Collectively, performance parameters specify how an alternative is 
going to accomplish its performance objectives and comply with imposed constraints. Unlike 
performance objectives, which are the same for all alternatives, performance parameters are 
unique to each alternative. 
 
Uncertainty: An imperfect state of knowledge or a physical variability resulting from a variety 
of factors including, but not limited to, lack of knowledge, applicability of information, 
physical variation, randomness or stochastic behavior, indeterminacy, judgment, and 
approximation. [1] 
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APPENDIX D: CONTENT GUIDE FOR THE TECHNICAL BASIS FOR 
DELIBERATION 
 
Technical Basis for Deliberation Content 
 
The Technical Basis for Deliberation (TBfD) document is the foundation document for the 
risk-informing activities conducted during Part 1 and Part 2 of the RIDM Process. The TBfD 
conveys information on the performance measures and associated imposed constraints for the 
analyzed decision alternatives. 
 
Because the TBfD provides the specific risk information to understand the uncertainty associated 
with each alternative, this document serves as the technical basis for risk-informed selection of 
alternatives within the program or project. The risk analysis team, working under the overall 
program/project guidance, develops TBfD documentation and updates the information provided 
as necessary based upon questions and/or concerns of stakeholders during deliberation. The risk 
analysis team works with the deliberators and decision-maker to support deliberation and 
alternative selection. 
 
The TBfD includes the following general sections: 
 
 Technical Summary: This section describes the problem to be solved by this effort and 
each of the general contexts of each of the alternatives. 
 
 Top-level Requirements and Expectations: This section contains the top-level 
requirements and expectations identified in Step 1 of the RIDM process. In cases 
involving diverse stakeholders, a cross reference between expectations and stakeholder 
may be presented. 
 
 Derivation of Performance Measures: This section shows the derivation of performance 
measures for the decision conducted in Step 1 of the RIDM process. Typical products are 
the objectives hierarchy and a table mapping the performance objectives to the 
performance measures. When proxy performance measures are used, their definitions are 
provided along with the rationale for their appropriateness. When constructed scales are 
used, the scales are presented. 
 
 Decision Alternatives: This section shows the compilation of feasible decision 
alternatives conducted in Step 2 of the RIDM process. Typical products are trade trees, 
including discussion of tree scope and rationales for the pruning of alternatives prior to 
risk analysis. Alternatives that are retained for risk analysis are described. This section 
also identifies any imposed constraints on the allowable performance measure values, and 
a map to the originating top-level requirements and/or expectations. 
 
 Risk Analysis Framework and Methods: This section presents the overall risk analysis 
framework and methods that are set in Step 3 of the RIDM process. For each analyzed 
alternative, it shows how discipline-specific models are integrated into an analysis 
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process that preserves correlations among performance parameters. Discipline-specific 
analysis models are identified and rationale for their selection is given. Performance 
parameters are identified for each alternative. 
 
 Risk Analysis Results: This section presents the risk analysis results that are quantified in 
Step 4 of the RIDM process. 
 
o Scenario descriptions: For each alternative, the main scenarios identified by the 
risk analysis are presented. 
 
o Performance measure pdfs: For each alternative, the marginal performance 
measure pdfs are presented, along with a discussion of any significant correlation 
between pdfs. 
 
o Imposed constraint risk: For each alternative, the risk with respect to imposed 
constraints is presented, along with a discussion of the significant drivers 
contributing to that risk. 
 
o Supporting analyses: For each alternative, uncertainty analyses and sensitivity 
studies are summarized. 
 
 Risk Analysis Credibility Assessment: This sections presents the credibility assessment 
performed in accordance with [31]. 
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APPENDIX E: CONTENT GUIDE FOR THE RISK-INFORMED 
SELECTION REPORT 
 
Risk-Informed Selection Report Content 
 
The Risk-Informed Selection Report (RISR) documents the rationale for selection of the selected 
alternative and demonstrates that the selection is risk-informed. The decision-maker, working 
with the deliberators and risk analysis team, develops the RISR. 
 
The RISR includes the following general sections: 
 
 Executive Summary: This summary describes the problem to be solved by this effort and 
each of the general contexts of each of the alternatives. It identifies the organizations and 
individuals involved in the decision-making process and summarizes the process itself, 
including any intermediate downselects. It presents the selected alternative and 
summarizes the basis for its selection. 
 
 Technical Basis for Deliberation: This section contains material from the TBfD (see 
Appendix D). 
 
 Performance Commitments: This section presents the performance measure ordering and 
risk tolerances used to develop the performance commitments during Step 5 of the RIDM 
process, with accompanying rationale. It tabulates the resultant performance 
commitments for each alternative. 
 
 Deliberation: This section documents the issues that were deliberated during Step 6 of the 
RIDM process. 
 
o Organization of the deliberations: The deliberation and decision-making structure 
is summarized, including any downselect decisions and proxy decision-makers. 
 
o Identification of the contending decision alternatives: The contending alternatives 
are identified, and rationales given for their downselection relative to the pruned 
alternatives. Dissenting opinions are also included. 
 
o Pros and cons of each contending alternative: For each contending alternative, its 
pros and cons are presented, along with relevant deliberation issues including 
dissenting opinions. This includes identifying violations of significant engineering 
standards, and the extent to which their intents are met by other means. 
 
o Deliberation summary material: Briefing material, etc., from the deliberators 
and/or risk analysts to the decision-maker (or decision-makers, in the case of 
multiple downselects) is presented. 
 
 Alternative Selection: This section documents the selection of an alternative conducted in 
Step 6 of the RIDM process. 
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o Selected alternative: The selected alternative is identified, along with a summary 
of the rationale for its selection. 
 
o Performance commitments: The finalized performance commitments for the 
selected alternative are presented, along with the final performance measure risk 
tolerances and performance measure ordering used to derive them. 
 
o Risk list: The RIDM risk list for the selected alternative is presented, indicating 
the risk-significant conditions extant at the time of the analysis, and the assessed 
impact on the ability to meet the performance commitments. 
 
o Decision robustness: An assessment of the robustness of the decision is presented. 
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APPENDIX F: SELECTED NASA EXAMPLES OF RIDM PROCESS 
ELEMENTS 
 
NASA has a long history of incorporating risk considerations into its decision-making processes. 
As part of the development of this handbook, NASA OSMA reviewed a number of decision 
forums and analyses for insights into the needs that the handbook should address, and for 
examples of decision-making techniques that are illustrative of elements of the resultant RIDM 
process. 
 
The following example process elements are intended as illustrations of the general intent of the 
RIDM process elements to which they correspond. They do not necessarily adhere in every detail 
to the guidance in this handbook. Nevertheless, they represent sound techniques that have 
risk-informed decision making at NASA. 
 
F.1 Stakeholder Expectations 
 
F.1.1 The Use of Design Reference Missions in ESAS [20] 
 
A series of DRMs was established to facilitate the derivation of requirements and the allocation 
of functionality between the major architecture elements. Three of the DRMs were for missions 
to the International Space Station (ISS): transportation of crew to and from the ISS, 
transportation of pressurized cargo to and from the ISS, and transportation of unpressurized 
cargo to the ISS. Three of the DRMs were for lunar missions: transportation of crew and cargo to 
and from anywhere on the lunar surface in support of 7-day “sortie” missions, transportation of 
crew and cargo to and from an outpost at the lunar south pole, and one-way transportation of 
cargo to anywhere on the lunar surface. A DRM was also established for transporting crew and 
cargo to and from the surface of Mars for an 18-month stay. Figures F-1 and F-2 show two of the 
ESAS DRMs: one for an ISS mission and one for a lunar mission. 
 
 
Figure F-1. Crew Transport to and from ISS DRM 
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Figure F-2. Lunar Sortie Crew with Cargo DRM 
 
 
F.2 Objectives Hierarchies and Performance Measures 
 
F.2.1 The Use of Figures of Merit (FOMs) in ESAS [20] 
 
The various trade studies conducted by the ESAS team used a common set of FOMs (a.k.a. 
performance measures) for evaluation.14 Each option was quantitatively or qualitatively assessed 
against the FOMs shown in Figure F-3. FOMs were included in the areas of: safety and mission 
success, effectiveness and performance, extensibility and flexibility, programmatic risk, and 
affordability. FOMs were selected to be as mutually exclusive and measurable as possible. 
 
 
                                                 
14 The inclusion of this example should not be taken as advocating any particular set of performance measures. In 
particular, the treatment of risk in terms of explicit risk FOMs is inconsistent with the RIDM process as discussed in 
Section 3.1.2. 
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Figure F-3. ESAS FOMs 
 
 
F.2.2 The Use of Figures of Merit in “Launch Order, Launch Separation, and Loiter 
in the Constellation 1½-Launch Solution” [36] 
 
The goal of this launch order analysis was to evaluate the identified operational concepts and 
then produce a series of relevant FOMs for each one. The most basic metric that was considered 
was the probability that each concept would result in a failure to launch the second vehicle. The 
FOMs for the study had to cover a number of areas that were significant to decision-makers on 
selecting a concept. Table F-1 lists the FOMs that were considered in this study. 
 
Table F-1. Launch Order Risk Analysis FOMs 
 
FOMs 
Probability of No Second Launch 
Cost of Failure 
Loss of Delivery Capability to the Surface 
Additional Risk to the Crew 
Additional Costs or Complexities 
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F.3 Compiling Alternatives 
 
F.3.1 The Use of Trade Trees in ESAS [20] 
 
Figure F-4 shows the broad trade space for Earth-to-orbit (ETO) transportation defined during 
ESAS. In order to arrive at a set of manageable trade options, external influences, as well as 
technical influences, were qualitatively considered in order to identify feasible decision 
alternatives. 
 
 
 
Figure F-4. Possible Range of ESAS Launch Trade Study 
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The decision points, illustrated numerically in Figure F-4, are described below, with the 
subsequent study decisions and supporting rationale. 
 
 Non-assisted versus Assisted Takeoff: Assisted launch systems (e.g., rocket sled, 
electromagnetic sled, towed) on the scale necessary to meet the payload lift requirements 
are beyond the state-of-the-art for near-term application. Therefore, Non-assisted Takeoff 
was chosen. 
 
 Vertical versus Horizontal Takeoff: Current horizontal takeoff vehicles and 
infrastructures are not capable of accommodating the gross takeoff weights of concepts 
needed to meet the payload lift requirements. Therefore, Vertical Takeoff was chosen. 
 
 No Propellant Tanking versus Propellant Tanking During Ascent: Propellant tanking 
during vertical takeoff is precluded due to the short period of time spent in the 
atmosphere 1) to collect propellant or 2) to transfer propellant from another vehicle. 
Therefore, No Propellant Tanking was chosen. 
 
 Rocket versus Air Breathing versus Rocket and Air Breathing: Air breathing and 
combined cycle (i.e., rocket and air breathing) propulsion systems are beyond the 
state-of-the-art for near-term application and likely cannot meet the lift requirements. 
Therefore, Rocket was chosen. 
 
 Expendable versus Partially Reusable versus Fully Reusable: Fully reusable systems are 
not cost-effective for the low projected flight rates and large payloads. Near-term budget 
availability and the desire for a rapid development preclude fully reusable systems. 
Therefore, Expendable or Partially Reusable was chosen. 
 
 Single-stage versus 2-Stage versus 3-Stage: Single-stage concepts on the scale necessary 
to meet the payload lift requirements are beyond the state-of-the-art for near-term 
application. Therefore, 2-Stage or 3-Stage was chosen. 
 
 Clean-sheet versus Derivatives of Current Systems: Near-term budget availability and the 
desire for a rapid development preclude clean-sheet systems. Therefore, Derivatives of 
Current Systems was chosen. 
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F.3.2 The Use of a Trade Tree in “Launch Order, Launch Separation, and Loiter in 
the Constellation 1½-Launch Solution” [36] 
 
The options that were evaluated in this decision analysis are depicted in the trade tree of 
Figure F-5. Two options were considered for launch order: launching Ares I first, followed by 
Ares V, identified as “I-V”; and launching Ares V first, followed by Ares I, identified as “V-I”. 
In addition, two types of LEO loiter duration were considered. The first loiter option was to 
support only a single TLI window. The second loiter option was to support multiple TLI 
windows. Because of the limited loiter duration of the Orion crew module in LEO, the option to 
support multiple TLI windows is applicable only to a V-I launch order. Finally, options for the 
planned separation between the two launches of 90-minutes and 24-hours were evaluated. The 
ESAS baseline of a V-I launch order, a loiter duration that supports multiple TLI windows, and a 
launch separation of 24-hours is identified in Figure F-5. 
 
 
 
Figure F-5. Launch Order Analysis Trade Space 
 
 
F.3.3 Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Servicing Analyses of Alternatives (AoA) [37] 
 
Figure F-6 is the top-level robotic servicing decision tree that was used in the HST servicing 
analysis to scope out the space of mission concepts within which to compile specific alternatives. 
Due to a driving concern of an uncontrolled re-entry of HST, the expectation at NASA since 
program inception was that HST would be disposed of at end of life. Achieving NASA’s 
casualty expectation standard of less than 1 in 10,000 requires some degree of active disposal of 
HST. Active disposal requires a minimum capability to rendezvous and dock with HST, and then 
either to boost the observatory to a disposal orbit or perform a controlled re-entry. 
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Figure F-6. Robotic Servicing Decision Tree 
 
The alternative development began in brainstorming sessions in which the study team developed 
“clean-sheet” concepts, which encompassed doing nothing to HST, rehosting the SM4 
instruments on new platforms, robotic servicing, and astronaut servicing. The brainstorming 
approach involved capturing the full set of ideas suggested by a large group of study team 
members during several alternatives development meetings. These ideas and concepts were then 
grouped into broad categories. The resulting database was augmented by internet and literature 
searches for related ideas, including the private sector responses on robotic servicing approaches 
and technologies. 
 
Table F-2 provides the full set of alternatives, from which the final set was selected. A number of 
unorthodox options, including foreign participation in the development of a mission, delivery of 
ordnance and detonation just prior to the re-entry atmospheric interface, and forcing breakup at 
re-entry with a missile defense interceptor were dismissed as being too risky, as well as 
politically and/or technically infeasible. 
 
Table F-2. Alternatives Brainstorming. 
 
Classification ID Description 
Minimum Action 1 Do nothing 
Minimum Action 2 Extend life through ground-based operational workarounds 
Minimum Action 3 Use HST attitude modulation to control entry point 
Rehost Option 4 Fly COS, WFC3, and FGS on new platform 
Rehost Option 5 Fly COS, WFC3, and FGS replacement instruments on new 
platform 
Rehost Option 6 Fly HST current and/or SM4 instruments on platforms already in 
development 
Rehost Option 7 Fly HST current and/or SM4 replacement instruments on platforms 
already in development 
Rehost Option 8 Rebuild HST 
Rehost Option 9 Replace full HST capability on a new platform 
De-orbit 10 Dock before EOM, de-orbit immediately 
Do nothing to Hubble
(~1 in 250 chance of casualty)
De-orbit Hubble
Service Hubble
Do not service
Batteries and gyros
Batteries, gyros, &
new instruments
Fly instruments on
new platforms
Do not fly instruments
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De-orbit 11 Dock before EOM, continue mission and de-orbit after EOM 
De-orbit 12 Dock after EOM, but before EOL and de-orbit immediately 
De-orbit 13 Dock after EOL and de-orbit 
Service & De-
orbit 
14 Service-only mission (separate de-orbit mission) 
Service & De-
orbit 
15 Launch SDM, service, stay attached for de-orbit 
Service & De-
orbit 
16 Launch SDM, service, detach and station-keep, then reattach for 
de-orbit 
Service & De-
orbit 
17 Launch SM and DM together, service, remove SM, DM stays on 
Robotic Option 18 De-orbit vs. graveyard orbit 
Robotic Option 19 Propulsive vs. attitude modulation reentry 
Robotic Option 20 External attachment vs. internal replacement vs. internal attachment
Robotic Option 21 Autonomous vs. telerobotic docking 
Robotic Option 22 Reboost as part of all servicing missions 
Robotic Option 23 Timing of docking and de-orbiting (before/after EOM/EOL) 
Robotic Option 24 Scope of servicing: full vs. extended life only (batteries + gyros + 
instruments vs. batteries + gyros) 
Unconventional 25 De-orbit via foreign partners or commercial firms 
Unconventional 26 Service via foreign partners or commercial firms 
Unconventional 27 CEV crewed servicing mission 
Unconventional 28 Uncontrolled de-orbit + KKV forced breakup at atmospheric 
interface 
Unconventional 29 Uncontrolled de-orbit + detonation forced breakup at atmospheric 
interface 
Unconventional 30 Use tug to deliver HST to ISS orbit for service by STS crew 
Unconventional 31 Propulsively transfer to ISS and retrieve via shuttle 
Unconventional 32 Point existing Earth-viewing orbital instruments upwards 
Unconventional 33 Safe haven near HST for Shuttle servicing 
Astronaut 
Servicing  
34 Do SM4 (on STS) 
 
A natural grouping emerged from this set of alternatives, whereby several complementary 
alternatives could be condensed into a single concept. Brainstorming was next linked with a 
deductive method. Options were distilled into four general families: Rehost, Disposal, Service, 
and Safe Haven as shown in Figure F-7. 
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Figure F-7. Option Tree Analysis 
 
The study team used a methodical approach to the process of selecting and constructing the final 
set of alternatives to ensure that the important elements in the robotic servicing trade space were 
included. The branches of the option tree were developed to a low enough level to cover various 
architectural and technology options at the conceptual level, such as the type of robotic 
mechanism and the amount of servicing performed. 
 
  
 
On current
development
New bus
Rebuild HST New design
Rehost Trades: 
• Instrument hardware 
• Orbit
Disposal Trades: 
• Deorbit vs. Graveyard
• Launch on need vs. stationkeep Cooperative Uncooperative
After science 
ends
Before science 
ends
Deorbit 
immediately
Deorbit 
immediately
Deorbit 
immediately
Deorbit 
after science
Robotic Service Trades: 
• Degree of autonomy
• Mechanism
• Scope
• Type
• Disposal type
Service Only
(With deorbit later)
Service and 
deorbit
One stage Two stages
Stay 
attached
Undock and 
station-keep
Detach SM,
DM stays
No Mission Disposal Service Safe HavenRehost
Deorbit 
before 
re-entry
eorbit 
before 
re-entry
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F.4 Risk Analysis of Alternatives 
 
F.4.1 Scenario-Based, Probabilistic Analysis of Performance in ESAS [20] 
 
One of the issues analyzed in ESAS was that of monostability of the entry vehicle. In this 
context, a monostable entry vehicle will only aerodynamically trim in one attitude, such that the 
vehicle would always be properly oriented for entry (similar to Soyuz). Requiring an entry to be 
inherently monostable results in an outer mold line with weight and packaging issues. ESAS 
looked at how much benefit, from a crew safety risk (i.e., P(LOC)) standpoint, monostability 
provides, so that the costs can be traded within the system design. In addition, ESAS looked at 
additional entry vehicle systems that are required to realize the benefits of monostability and 
considered systems that could remove the need to be monostable. 
 
The risk analysis consisted of two parts: a flight mechanics stability element and a P(LOC) 
assessment. The two pieces were combined to analyze the risk impact of entry vehicle stability. 
The risk assessment was performed using the simple event tree shown in Figure F-8, 
representing the pivotal events during the entry mission phase. Each pivotal event was assigned a 
success probability determined from historical reliability data. In addition, mitigations to key 
pivotal events were modeled using the results from the stability study, as were the success 
probabilities for ballistic entry. In the event tree, the “Perform Ballistic Entry” event mitigates 
the “Perform Entry” (attitude and control) event, while the “Land and Recover from Ballistic 
Entry” event replaces the “Land and Recover” event should a ballistic entry occur. 
 
 
Figure F-8. ESAS Entry, Descent, and Landing Event Tree 
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F.4.2 Probabilistic Analysis of CLV Crew Safety Performance and Mission Success 
Performance in ESAS [20] 
 
ESAS assessed more than 30 launch vehicle concepts to determine P(LOM) and P(LOC) 
estimates. Evaluations were based on preliminary vehicle descriptions that included propulsion 
elements and Shuttle-based launch vehicle subsystems. The P(LOM) and P(LOC) results for 
each of the CLV results are shown graphically in Figures F-9 and F-10, respectively. The results 
are expressed as probability distributions over the epistemic uncertainty modeled in the analysis, 
indicating the range of possible values for P(LOM) and P(LOC) given the state of knowledge at 
the time the analysis was done. Aleatory uncertainty has been accounted for in the analysis by 
expressing the results in terms of the probabilistic performance measures of P(LOM) and 
P(LOC). These measures represent the expected values for loss of mission and loss of crew, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Figure F-9. CLV LEO Launch Systems LOM 
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Figure F-10. CLV LEO Launch Systems LOC 
 
 
F.4.3 Downselection in “Launch Order, Launch Separation, and Loiter in the 
Constellation 1½-Launch Solution” [36] 
 
The launch order analysis down-selected to the preferred option through various down-select 
cycles that sequentially pruned options from the trade tree by focusing on various FOMs in each 
down-selection cycle until only one branch was left. Figure F-11 shows the overall trade tree and 
the down-selections made through 4 iterations considering various FOMs in pruning the tree, 
including a summary of each down-select rationale. The first down-select eliminating multiple 
TLI window support for a I-V launch order was based on the trade space constraint of not 
modifying the current Orion vehicle, which has a capacity to loiter in LEO for a maximum of 
four days, limited by consumables.  
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Figure F-11. Launch Order Downselection and Rationale 
 
F.4.4 Cost Sensitivity Study in “Launch Order, Launch Separation, and Loiter in the 
Constellation 1½-Launch Solution” [36] 
 
The greatest level of uncertainty in the launch order analysis involves the transportation element 
replacement costs. Because of the uncertainty involving fixed and marginal costs for Altair and 
because of the uncertain nature of cost estimates in early design, large shifts could potentially 
occur in the cost data for all elements as the designs mature. 
 
Figure F-12 was used to determine the optimal launch order for any set of Ares I and Ares V 
stack replacement costs, based on minimizing the expected cost of failure. The cost of the Ares V 
stack is specified on the horizontal axis, and the cost of the Ares I stack is specified on the 
vertical axis. The sloping red line in the center of the figure represents the break-even cost 
boundary. If the set of costs is below this line in the light-blue region, then the I-V launch order 
is preferable. If the set of costs are above the red line in the light-green region, then the V-I 
launch order is preferable. 
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The intent of the figure was to provide a visual indication of how much change could occur in 
the cost estimates before the launch order decision would be reconsidered. The analysis cost 
estimates are represented as a horizontal bar on the chart. The Ares I cost is normalized to 1. The 
Ares V cost is represented as a range of 1.65 to 2.88 times the cost of Ares I, which represents 
the full range that is produced by the possible inclusion of fixed costs. It is evident that, even at 
the low end of the Ares V cost range, a large margin still exists before the break-even point is 
reached. 
 
 
 
Figure F-12. Launch Decision Relative to Ares I and Ares V Stack Costs 
 
F.4.5 Performance Communication in ESAS [20] 
 
A summary of the ESAS FOM assessments for the Shuttle-derived CLV candidate vehicles is 
presented in Figure F-13. The assessment was conducted as a consensus of discipline experts and 
does not use weighting factors or numerical scoring, but rather a judgment of high/medium/low 
(green/yellow/red) factors, with high (green) being the most favorable and low (red) being the 
least favorable. 
 
The Shuttle-derived options were assigned favorable (green) ratings in the preponderance of the 
FOMs, primarily due to the extensive use of hardware from an existing crewed launch system, 
the capability to use existing facilities with modest modifications, and the extensive flight and 
test database of critical systems—particularly the RSRB and SSME. The introduction of a new 
upper stage engine and a five-segment RSRB variant in LV 15 increased the DDT&E cost 
sufficiently to warrant an unfavorable (red) rating. The five-segment/J–2S+ CLV (LV 16) shares 
the DDT&E impact of the five-segment booster, but design heritage for the J–2S+ and the RSRB 
resulted in a more favorable risk rating. 
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Applicability to lunar missions was seen as favorable (green), with each Shuttle-derived CLV 
capable of delivering the crew to the 28.5-deg LEO exploration assembly orbit. Extensibility to 
commercial and DoD missions was also judged favorably (green), with the Shuttle-derived CLV 
providing a LEO payload capability in the same class as the current EELV heavy-lift vehicles. 
 
 
 
Figure F-13. Shuttle-Derived CLV FOM Assessment Summary 
 
 
F.4.6 Performance Communication in the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Servicing 
Analyses of Alternatives (AoA) [37] 
 
In order to communicate the cost-effectiveness of each alternative, several primary MOEs were 
combined into one governing metric. To develop this metric, an expected value approach was 
taken. Expected value theory is based on the notion that the true, realized value of an event is its 
inherent value times the probability that the event will occur. 
 
The expected value approach took into account the performance of each alternative relative to 
post-SM415 capability (MOE #5), the probability of mission success (MOE #4) and the 
probability that the HST will have survived to be in the desired state for the mission (MOE #3), 
which is a function of HST system reliability and development time (MOE # 2). The calculation 
of expected value was the value of the alternative times the probability of the alternative 
successfully completing its mission: 
 
Expected Value = MOE #3 * MOE #4 * MOE #5 
 
Figure F-14 illustrates the results of the combined expected value plotted against life-cycle cost. 
The results indicate that the disposal alternatives provided no value relative to observatory 
capability. The expected value calculation also indicated that rehosting both the SM4 instruments 
on new platforms provided higher value at equivalent cost to the robotic-servicing missions. 
                                                 
15 Servicing Mission 4 was the HST servicing mission previously scheduled for 2005. 
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There was, however, a gap in science with the rehost alternatives that was not captured in this 
expected value calculation. 
 
 
 
Figure F-14. Expected Value versus Life Cycle Cost 
 
The robotic servicing alternatives cluster in the lower right corner of the plot, suggesting that the 
value of these alternatives was limited based on difficulty of the mission implementation, the 
complexity of the servicing mission, and the reliability of HST after servicing. 
 
SM4 had costs in the same range as the rehost and robotic-servicing alternatives. It had the added 
benefit of higher probability of mission success than the robotic servicing missions, and did not 
suffer from the gap in science associated with the rehost alternatives. 
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